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 PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON ASPECTS 
OF HOLOCAUST-ERA  
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN COURTS 
BURT NEUBORNE∗ 
Aided by diplomatic initiatives by Germany and the United States, and by 
the vigorous support of many political figures and community organizations, 
Holocaust-related litigation in American courts against Swiss, German, 
Austrian, and French corporations over the past six years has resulted in the 
assemblage of a vast pool of assets valued in excess of $8 billion for 
distribution to Holocaust victims around the world.1  
 ∗ John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law and Legal Director, Brennan Center for Justice, New 
York University School of Law. The author served as counsel to the plaintiffs in many of the cases 
discussed herein. Because of the author’s personal involvement in the litigation and negotiations 
discussed herein, special standards of citation are employed. When documents that were filed in the 
litigation are discussed, copies have been lodged with the Law Quarterly and are available for scrutiny, 
see infra note 4. Personal observations of the author, as well as his subjective opinions, are not 
supported by citations, but are based on firsthand knowledge or belief. Reported cases arising out of 
the Holocaust litigation are listed infra note 2. For clarity’s sake, the citations are occasionally 
repeated in full in later footnotes. 
 1. The recent Holocaust-era cases are described in Michael J. Bayzler, The Holocaust 
Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L., 11 (2002); Michael J. 
Bayzler, Litigating the Holocaust, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in American 
Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (2000); Michael J. Bayzler, www.swissbanks.com: The Legality and 
Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement with the Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S64 (2002) 
(Symposium Issue). I am grateful to Professor Bayzler for his thorough scholarship that makes it 
possible to discuss the Holocaust litigation on a more informed basis. For a helpful overview of 
Holocaust-related litigation, with particularly valuable commentaries by Stuart Eizenstat and Otto Graf 
Lambsdorff, respective heads of the United States and German delegations to the German negotiations, 
see Symposium, Holocaust Restitution: Reconciling Moral Imperatives with Legal Initiatives and 
Diplomacy, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2001). 
 Several books commenting on the Holocaust litigation have been written. Two journalists for The 
Financial Times have published a narrative of the Swiss and German litigation that emphasizes the 
participants’ personalities. JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIMS’ FORTUNE: INSIDE THE 
EPIC BATTLE OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2002). Stuart Eizenstat has completed a 
manuscript that will, no doubt, provide valuable insight into the diplomatic process. Michael Bayzler’s 
thoughtful manuscript dissects the legal and moral issues raised by the litigation from the perspective 
of a sympathetic member of the Jewish community.  
 For the perspective of lawyers for the German defendants, see Detlev Vagts & Peter Murray, 
Litigating the Nazi Labor Claims: The Path Not Taken, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503 (2002). For criticism 
of that the settlement does not go far enough, see Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness 
of Noblesse: A Critique of the German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of 
the Third Reich, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2002). For an unremittingly hostile commentary on the 
Holocaust-related litigation, see NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, THE HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWISH SUFFERING (2000). Finkelstein has called for my 
disbarment. For a partial response to his charges, see the exchange of letters in The Nation. Letters, 
THE NATION, Feb. 18, 2002; Letters, THE NATION, Dec. 25, 2000; Letters, THE NATION, Oct. 23, 
2000.  
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Although class action litigation in American courts provided the formal 
matrix within which the Holocaust-era issues were litigated and resolved, I 
have analogized the process to a three-legged stool, with each of the three 
legs crucial to the success of the enterprise. Class action litigation 
provided a crucial leg, permitting the development of a coherent theory of 
recovery and offering defendants a method of closure.2  
 2. A chronological listing of major reported decisions and orders rendered during the recent 
Holocaust-era class action litigation follows:  
In re Holocaust Assets Litigation (Swiss Bank Litigation):  
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18014 (E.D.N.Y. Oct.7, 1998) (Joint 
Stipulation describing settlement in principle); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp.2d 
139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding fairness of settlement under Rule 23(e)); In re Holocaust Victim 
Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding definition of plaintiff class); In re Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litig., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29529 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2000) (dismissing appeal for 
failure to comply with calendar); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20817 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000) (accepting Special Master’s allocation plan); In re Holocaust Victim Assets 
Litig., 2001 WL 419967 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2001) (defining membership in Slave Labor II class); In re 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 14 Fed. Appx. 132 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding plan of allocation); In re 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 282 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating definition of Slave Labor II 
class; remand for determination of parties’ intentions); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20195 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2002) (denying risk multiplier). 
German Slave Labor Cases:  
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissing slave labor claims as non-
justiciable because subsumed by Two-Plus-Four Treaty; dismissing German law claims under two-
year statute of limitations); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp.2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(dismissing slave labor claims as non-justiciable); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants 
Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000) (upholding voluntary dismissal of slave labor claims in 
connection with the establishment of the German Foundation); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German 
Defendants Litig. (Frumkin), 129 F. Supp.2d 370 (D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing slave labor case in 
accordance with the Statement of Interest filed by the United States); In re Nazi Era Cases Against 
German Defendants Litig., 213 F. Supp.2d 439 (D.N.J. 2002) (denying Rule 60(b) motion to enforce 
interest payments allegedly owed to German Foundation by German industry). See also Deutsch v. 
Turner Corp., CV-4405 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (appeal pending). 
German and Austrian Banks:  
In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp.2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding 
Austrian bank settlement under Rule 23(e)); D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(affirming fairness of Austrian bank settlement under Rule 23(e)); In re Austrian & German Bank 
Holocaust Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2311 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001) (denying motion to dismiss 
German litigation voluntarily); Duveen v. United States District Court (In re Austrian & German 
Holocaust Litig.), 250 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001) (granting writ of mandamus compelling voluntary 
dismissal of German bank litigation); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15573 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2001) (denying motion to forfeit fees on the ground of conflict 
of interest) (appeal pending); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21433 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2002) (denying motion to compel interest payments). See also Ungaro-
Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, No. 1:01 CV 2547 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2001) (seeking damages from 
German banks for property seizures). 
Insurance Cases: 
 
Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2922 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2000); 
Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11004 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2000); 
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Diplomacy provided an indispensable second leg. Deputy Secretary 
Stuart Eizenstat’s leadership at the U.S. State Department and the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury provided the impetus that launched the 
movement, and he was a source of wisdom and leadership that saw it to a 
successful conclusion. Otto Graf Lambsdorff’s steady and forthright 
guidance of the German delegation made candid negotiations possible.  
The third leg—community insistence on dealing with long-delayed issues 
arising from the Holocaust—was equally important. In my opinion, neither 
litigation nor diplomacy would have succeeded in the absence of an aroused 
public demanding justice for Holocaust victims.  
Since I was a vigorous participant in much of the litigation,3 I make no 
pretensions to academic neutrality in discussing the fascinating and difficult 
Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11991 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000); In 
re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust Ins. Litig., Judicial Panel on MultiDistrict Litig., 2000 
U.S.Dist.LEXIS 17853 (Dec. 4, 2000); Winters v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18193 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 18, 2000); Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Gallagher, 267 
F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2001); Haberfeld v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4391 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2002); Schenker v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., Consol., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12845 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002) (granting Basler and Winterthur motions to dismiss for lack of in 
personam jurisdiction); Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. Am v. Low, 296 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002); 
In re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust Ins. Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18119 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2002) (denying motion for order to suggest that multidistrict litigation panel remand cases to 
California courts); In re Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. Holocaust Ins. Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18127 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2002) (denying motion to dismiss Generali). 
French Bank case: 
Bodner v. Paribas, 114 F. Supp.2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss). 
French Railroad case: 
Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 175 F. Supp.2d 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds; appeal pending in the Second Circuit). 
 3. Beginning in January 1997, at the suggestion of the district court, I served as cocounsel to all 
plaintiffs in the Swiss bank litigation and helped to organize the Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee. On 
August 1, 1997, I argued the motions to dismiss before Chief Judge Korman. During the ensuing year, 
I participated in the settlement negotiations that culminated in an agreement in principle on August 12, 
1998. Shortly after the formal settlement agreement was signed on January 26, 1999, Chief Judge 
Korman designated me as lead settlement counsel. Since that time, I have been deeply involved in the 
day-to-day defense and administration of the settlement.  
 Beginning in December 1998, I served as a principal lawyer in the slave labor cases against 
German industry. I argued the motions to dismiss before Judges Greenaway and Debevoise and 
participated in the negotiations that culminated in the establishment of the German Foundation 
“Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” (the German Foundation) as an alternative to continued 
Holocaust-related litigation in American courts. I played a minor role in the cases seeking relief from 
German banks and insurance companies. I played no role in the Austrian or French litigation.  
 On August 21, 2000, I was nominated by the United States to serve as a trustee of the German 
Foundation, established to provide compensation to Holocaust victims. Although I am proud of my 
role in the Holocaust cases, I acknowledge the dominant contribution by my colleagues, Melvyn I. 
Weiss and Michael Hausfeld, in conceiving the Holocaust litigation and driving it forward, as well as 
the valuable contributions of many other colleagues to the success of the enterprise.   
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legal issues raised by the cases.4 Moreover, since we are midstream in 
distributing the assets, it is too early for a complete assessment of the success 
or failure of the litigation in providing relief to specific categories of 
Holocaust victims.  
As of November 1, 2002, however, we have progressed to the point 
where a preliminary report on distribution is in order. Perhaps more 
importantly, we are far enough into the process to begin asking fundamental 
questions about the legal and moral issues raised by the litigation.  
 4. To assist in discussion of the issues, I have lodged the following documents related to the 
litigation with the editors of the Washington University Law Quarterly in order to assure their ready 
availability to scholars and critics:  
(a) The Swiss Bank Settlement Agreement dated January 26, 1999 (including Amendment 1, 
Amendment 2, and Escrow Agreement);  
(b) Plaintiffs’ June 1997 Memorandum of Law in the Swiss Bank case filed at the trial level;  
(c) Brief of Appellants to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, dated January 2000, in the German 
slave labor cases;    
(d) Three declarations that I filed in November 1999 and June 2000, seeking approval of the Swiss 
bank settlement and its complex allocation plan;  
(e) A declaration that I filed dated November 13, 2000, in support of the German Foundation’s 
allocation plan;  
(f) Special Master Judah Gribetz’ two-volume Proposed Plan of Allocation and Distribution in the 
Swiss banks case;  
(g) The “Berlin Accords,” establishing the German Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility, 
and the Future,” which consist of three documents: (i) the Joint Statement of the Negotiating 
Parties, (ii) the Executive Agreement between Germany and the United States, and (iii) the 
German Foundation Law;  
(h) The Austrian Bank Settlement Agreement, including amendments;  
(i) The transcript of the Fairness Hearing in the Austrian banks case; 
(j) United States District Judge Shirley Kram’s March 20, 2001, Order declining to permit 
dismissal of the German bank cases;  
(k) Judge Kram’s Order and transcript dated May 21, 2001, dismissing efforts to enforce the so-
called “Austrian assignment”;      
(l) The report of Special Master Charles Stillman in the German and Austrian Bank cases;  
(m) Various orders by United States District Judge Michael B. Mukasey dismissing the German 
insurance cases.  
(n) The Independent Committee of Eminent Persons’ Report on Dormant Accounts of Victims 
Nazi Persecution in Swiss Banks (“Volcker Report”); and 
(o) Information on the Agreement Concerning Holocaust Era Insurance Claims dating back to the 
Era of National Socialism (1933-1945). 
 Additional information on the Swiss bank case can be found at www.swissbankclaims.com. A 
helpful timeline of the Swiss banks litigation can be found in the In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig. 
(“Swiss Banks”) Timeline, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 287 (2001). See also supra note 2 for a list of 
reported cases. 
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I propose to begin by describing the status of distribution efforts as of 
November 1, 2002. I will then attempt a narrative description of the principal 
cases that led to the Holocaust settlements, including a description of the 
$1.25 billion Swiss bank litigation that began the current round of Holocaust-
related litigation and the establishment of the $5.2 billion German 
Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future” in response to 
litigation challenging the use of slave labor by German companies during 
World War II. I will close with some preliminary personal reflections on 
aspects of the legal and moral issues raised by the Holocaust litigation. 
I. A REPORT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS TO HOLOCAUST VICTIMS 
The acid test of the Holocaust litigation is its ability to deliver funds to 
Holocaust victims. As of November 1, 2002, approximately $2.85 billion has 
been distributed to defined categories of Holocaust victims. 
A. Distributions to Former Slave and Forced Laborers 
The most successful distribution efforts have taken place in the context of 
the approximately one million persons who are still alive, and who were 
compelled to perform “slave” or “forced” labor for the Nazis during World 
War II.5 A grisly terminology emerged from the negotiations. Laborers 
compelled by the Nazis to work in particularly horrific conditions in 
concentration camps or their equivalent were designated as “slave laborers.” 
Jews constituted the single largest class of slave laborers, although non-
Jewish slave laborers, particularly Roma-Sinti, existed, as well. Laborers 
compelled to work in less horrific conditions were designated as “forced 
laborers,” with a corresponding diminution in the amount of compensation. 
The terminology reflected a Nazi view that slave laborers, usually racially 
defined as subhuman, were wasting assets not even worth keeping alive; 
forced laborers, mostly non-Jewish Slavs, were treated as depreciable assets, 
valuable enough to keep alive, albeit under dreadful conditions.6  
 5. Slave labor and forced labor payments are made to survivors, not to heirs. A similar 
judgment was made reluctantly in 1988 in connection with congressionally authorized payments to 
Japanese-Americans who had been incarcerated in internment camps during World War II. See 50 
U.S.C.S. Appx § 1989 (2002).  
 6. See BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST 
FOR COMPENSATION 17-30 (2002).  
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The Swiss bank settlement has allocated between $200 million and $300 
million for payments to laborers.7 The Swiss bank settlement provides relief 
solely to surviving slave laborers compelled to work for Axis-headquartered 
companies, with the exception of a small number of forced laborers who 
were compelled to work directly for Swiss companies.8  
The German Foundation, on the other hand, is designed to provide relief 
to all surviving persons who were slave laborers or forced laborers and has 
allocated DM 8.1 billion (approximately $4 billion) for slave labor and 
forced labor claims.9 Under the terms of the German Foundation, surviving 
slave laborers are entitled to a payment of DM 15,000 (or about $7,500). 
Under the terms of the Swiss bank settlement, surviving slave laborers who 
were “victims or targets of Nazi persecution,” defined as Jews, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Roma-Sinti (gypsies), homosexuals, and the disabled, are entitled 
to an additional payment of $1,450. Thus, each surviving slave laborer is 
entitled to a total of $8,950 from a combination of the German Foundation 
and the Swiss bank settlement fund.  
Surviving forced laborers, primarily citizens of conquered Eastern 
European nations who do not belong to one of the five defined victim groups, 
are entitled to a sliding scale of payments from the German Foundation 
designed to reflect the severity of the conditions under which they were 
forced to labor. 
Thus far, 115,000 surviving Jewish slave laborers have been identified by 
the staffs of the German Foundation and the Swiss bank settlement fund10 
and have received payment from both the Swiss bank settlement fund 
($1,450 each) and the German Foundation ($7,500 each). In, addition, the 
claims of more than 750,000 surviving non-Jewish slave and forced laborers 
have been validated by the German Foundation, which has distributed more 
 7. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 14 Fed. Appx. 132 (2d Cir. 2001) (approving 
allocation plan). See also In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20817 
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000); Special Master Gribetz’ Proposed Plan of Allocation, supra note 4(f), at 15, 
27-35. 
 8. See The Swiss Settlement Agreement, supra note 4(a). See also Special Master Gribetz’ 
Proposed Plan of Allocation, supra note 4(f), at 142-67.      
 9. See The Berlin Accords, supra note 4(g); see The German Foundation Legislation, §§  11-
1(1)-(2). 
 10. The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (the Claims Conference), an 
umbrella group formed in 1951 representing Diaspora Jewry, has performed valuable staff work in the 
slave labor area for both the German Foundation and the Swiss bank settlement fund. It is estimated 
that as many as 50,000 to 75,000 additional surviving Jewish slave laborers remain to be compensated. 
Labor claims by non-Jews are handled by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
headquartered in Geneva, and by victims’ organizations in the various affected Eastern European 
countries working under the supervision of the German Foundation. The German Foundation has 
recognized the claims of more than 750,000 non-Jewish slave laborers and forced laborers.  
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than 2.5 billion Euros (approximately $2.4 billion) to organizations of 
Holocaust victims for transfer to specified individual slave laborers and 
forced laborers in its first eighteen months of existence.  
B. Distributions to Owners of Bank Accounts 
The Swiss bank settlement fund allocates up to $800 million for the return 
of assets deposited in Swiss banks on the eve of the Holocaust.11 The 
German Foundation has established a property fund of approximately DM 1 
billion ($500 million), a portion of which is available for the payment of 
claims related to unreturned German and Austrian bank accounts. An 
additional $30 million to $40 million is also available for Austrian bank 
accounts from the Austrian bank settlement.12 
The Swiss bank settlement has made significant strides in returning bank 
accounts to their rightful owners. Under the leadership of Paul Volcker and 
Michael Bradfield, serving as Special Masters under the auspices and 
supervision of Chief Judge Korman, the Claims Resolution Tribunal II (CRT 
II), operating in Zurich as an arm of the district court, has, with the grudging 
cooperation of Swiss banking authorities and the Swiss banks, assembled a 
data base of 46,000 Swiss bank accounts identified by Mr. Volcker as having 
a probable or possible link to Holocaust victims;13 has published identifying 
information relating to the 21,000 accounts with the highest probability of 
Holocaust connection; has received 32,000 claims as a result of the 
publication; and has generated 12,000 computer matches. The 12,000 
matched accounts are now the subject of intense scrutiny by the CRT II to 
determine ownership.14 
 11. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 14 Fed. Appx. 132 (2d Cir. 2001). See also In re 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20817 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000); Special 
Master Gribetz’ Proposed Plan of Allocation, supra note 4(f), at 15.  
 12. See D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 13. The 46,000 accounts were identified as the result of an intensive audit of Swiss banks 
performed by the International Committee of Eminent Persons (ICEP), popularly known as the 
Volcker Committee. The findings of the Volcker Committee were published on December 8, 1999. See 
Report of the International Committee of Eminent Persons Concerning Swiss Bank Accounts Related 
to the Holocaust, available at http://222.lcep-iaep.org/final report/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2002). Mr. 
Volcker initially sought access to a database consisting of the 4.1 million accounts opened during 
World War II for which records are available. The Swiss banks refused. The parties compromised on 
access to a database confined to the 46,000 highest probability accounts, with a willingness to assist in 
verifying additional claims if a reasoned basis exists. Plaintiffs have reserved the right to demand a 
broader database if Mr. Volcker deems it necessary. 
 14. For a description of the operation of the process, see William Glaberson, Settling Accounts, 
but Not Minds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at B1. 
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Thus far, 400 bank account claims have been validated by CRT II and 
approved by Chief Judge Korman. Three seven-figure awards have been 
made to Swiss bank account claimants. The first 400 awards are averaging 
more than $100,000 each. As of November 1, 2002, the Swiss bank 
settlement fund has distributed approximately $50 million to bank account 
holders.  
The bank account claims process has been complicated and slowed by the 
fact that the banks engaged in massive destruction of the relevant records. Of 
the 6.8 million accounts opened in Switzerland during the relevant period, all 
records for approximately 2.75 million accounts have been completely 
destroyed. Most of the transactional records relating to the remaining 4.1 
million accounts have been badly damaged.15 Despite the destruction of 
records, however, steady progress is being made in dealing with the pending 
claims.  
Slower progress has been made in dealing with bank account claims by 
the German Foundation, in part because energy has been understandably 
concentrated on providing expeditious payments to surviving elderly slave 
laborers and forced laborers; in part because the German Foundation 
property fund is also responsible for insurance claims, which are still in a 
state of flux;16 in part because many provable German bank account claims 
have already been paid; and in part because the claims process is so time 
consuming. Approximately 25,000 claims for property loss have been filed 
with the IOM in Geneva, which is acting as the Secretariat for the German 
Foundation’s property commission. 
Finally, payments averaging $5,000 each to approximately 1,000 
qualifying Austrian bank account claimants out of 58,000 applicants have 
been authorized by the Austrian settlement fund.17  
 15. The destruction of records was pursuant to Swiss law, which requires that records be 
maintained for only ten years. Despite the ongoing controversy over the existence of unreturned 
accounts, the Swiss banks took full advantage of Swiss law by destroying vast quantities of data 
needed to validate claims. The Report of the Volcker Committee is critical of the banks’ decision to 
destroy the records. See The Independent Committee of Eminent Persons’ Report on Dormant 
Accounts of Victims Nazi Persecution in Swiss Banks (“Volcker Report”), supra note 4(n), at 12. See 
also id. at 6, 108-09, 111.  
 16. After two years of intensive negotiations between and among the German Foundation, the 
German Insurance Association, and the International Commission on Holocaust-Era Insurance Claims 
(ICHEIC), the parties announced agreement on a claims process. It is too early to forecast whether the 
process will be a success. Holocaust-era litigation continues against non-German insurance companies. 
See In re Assicurazioni Generali v. S.p.A. Holocaust Ins. Litig., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18127 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2002). A description of the ICHEIC process has been lodged with the Law Quarterly. See 
supra note 4(o). 
 17. Austrian bank claims are being processed in connection with a Rule 23 class action 
settlement described infra at II.C. A substantial Holocaust compensation fund has been established by 
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C. Distributions to Refugees 
At the request of the Swiss defendants, the Swiss bank settlement fund is 
designed to make modest payments of up to $2,500 each to targets or victims 
of Nazi persecution who were turned away at the border, expelled from 
Switzerland, or mistreated in Switzerland because of membership in one of 
the five victim groups.18 As of November 1, 2002, approximately 550 
individual refugee claims had been validated and paid by the Swiss bank 
settlement fund.  
D. Cy Pres Distribution of Looted Assets 
The Swiss bank settlement is also designed to compensate those victims 
of Nazi looting who are: (1) members of one of the five groups defined as 
“victims or targets of Nazi persecution” and (2) whose property was 
knowingly “fenced” through a Swiss bank. The Special Master found that the 
vast potential size of the class, and the difficulty of linking particular items of 
looted property to a Swiss bank, made it impossible to administer the Looted 
Assets settlement class on an individualized basis.19 Instead, the Court 
directed cy pres administration of the class on behalf of the poorest 
Holocaust victims throughout the world.  
Accordingly, the district court has allocated $145 million to the Looted 
Assets class and directed its distribution to agencies serving the poorest 
Holocaust survivors throughout the world.20 A ten-year plan is in place to 
assure the poorest survivors receive continuing financial support during the 
waning years of their lives. The first two years’ payments have been 
completed. 
the Austrian government, but discussion of allocation criteria has not been completed. Since I played 
no role in the Austrian negotiations, I cannot comment on the Austrian Holocaust fund. 
 18. See Special Master Gribetz’ Proposed Plan of Allocation, supra note 4(f), at 15, 35-38. 
 19. See id. at 110-19. 
 20. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20817 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 
2000). See also In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 14 Fed. Appx. 132 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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E. The German Foundation’s “Future Fund” 
The terms of the German Foundation provide for the establishment of a 
substantial fund to support toleration in Europe in an effort to honor those 
who failed to survive the Holocaust. The initial size of the Future Fund is 
DM 700 million (approximately $350 million), but the hope is that the fund 
will grow into a major force in European life. Annual grants from the fund’s 
income to support worthy projects linked to the values of toleration and 
remembrance of the Holocaust are currently being made.  
The good news is that approximately $2.85 billion has actually been 
distributed to Holocaust victims in the past two years at minimal cost to the 
victims.21 The bad news is that despite intense negotiations, it has taken 
almost two years to develop a claims process for unpaid Holocaust-era 
insurance policies,22 payment of German property claims has not yet begun, 
and the massive destruction of records by the Swiss banks is complicating 
efforts to return Swiss accounts to rightful owners.   
 21. The sole payment to counsel thus far has been an arbitration award of approximately DM 124 
million (approximately $52 million) paid by the German Foundation, apportioned between payment of 
modest incentive awards of DM 15,000 to each of 278 named plaintiffs, and payment of out-of-pocket 
costs and attorneys fees to 51 lawyers whose efforts were deemed instrumental by the arbitrators, 
Nicholas deβ Katzenbach and Kenneth Feinberg, in bringing the German Foundation into being. In 
June 2001, I received an award of DM 10 million ($4.3 million) from the arbitrators. 
 Payment of attorneys’ fees by the German Foundation to certain lawyers has been challenged on 
the ground that the lawyers were in a conflict of interest situation with their role in the Austrian bank 
settlement. See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15573 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2001).  
 As lead settlement counsel, I have recommended payment of a total of approximately $6.5 million 
in attorneys’ fees in connection with the $1.25 billion Swiss bank settlement. The extremely modest 
fee structure in the Swiss bank case was made possible by the decision of Melvyn Weiss, Michael 
Hausfeld, and myself to represent the plaintiffs without fee in connection with achieving the 
settlement. Hourly payments for postsettlement work needed to administer the fund will be sought. See 
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20195 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2002) (denying 
risk multiplier).   
 22. See supra note 16. See also Information on the Agreement Concerning Holocaust Era 
Insurance Claims dating back to the Era of National Socialism (1933-1945), supra note 4(o). 
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II. THE LITIGATION 
A. The Swiss Bank Litigation 
1. Origins of Litigation 
The current legal effort23 to secure redress for Holocaust victims began in 
late 1996 with the filing of multiple, overlapping Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 (Rule 23) class actions against several Swiss banks on behalf of 
persons alleging that funds deposited by Holocaust victims in Swiss banks in 
the years preceding the Holocaust had not been returned to their lawful 
owners.24 In early February 1997, faced with multiple overlapping actions, 
Chief Judge Korman requested me to serve in a pro bono capacity as 
cocounsel for the plaintiffs in all actions and to assist in forming an 
Executive Committee to manage the litigation against the Swiss banks.25 
With the cooperation of virtually all plaintiffs’ counsel,26 a ten-person 
 23. Earlier efforts to use the courts to seek relief for Holocaust victims had little success. See, 
e.g., Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (dismissing a suit by Jewish-
Americans sent to concentration camps by Nazis on sovereign immunity grounds; Germany ultimately 
settled with the eleven plaintiffs for $2.1 million); Kelberine v. Societé Int’l, 363 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 
1966) (dismissing as nonjusticiable slave labor class action against European corporation).  
 Although I believe that plaintiffs would have prevailed on the deposited assets claims against the 
Swiss banks and the slave labor claims against German corporations, the fact remains that no 
American court has yet ruled in favor of a Holocaust claimant on the merits. The closest that any 
Holocaust plaintiff has come to legal success was in Bodner v. Paribas, 114 F. Supp.2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000), where Judge Sterling Johnson denied a motion to dismiss filed by several French banks, 
precipitating a settlement on the merits brokered by Secretary Eizenstat in the closing days of the 
Clinton administration.   
 24. In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., Master Docket No. CV-96-4849 (ERK) (E.D.N.Y. 
1998). The credibility of plaintiffs’ allegations rested on an influential report compiled by Stuart 
Eizenstat for the State Department detailing Swiss bank complicity in financing Nazi operations. See 
U.S. Department of State, Preliminary Study on U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold 
and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II (May 1997), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/prt_9705_ng_links.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2002). 
 25. I had recently appeared before Chief Judge Korman as counsel for Steve Forbes in his 
successful effort to gain a place on the New York State Republican Presidential Primary ballot. See 
Rockerfeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Most recently, I had represented Senator 
John McCain before Judge Korman in his successful effort to appear on the 2000 New York State 
Republican Primary. See Molinari v. Powers, 82 F. Supp.2d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The case was 
assigned to Chief Judge Korman because it was related to the 1996 Forbes litigation. As young 
lawyers, Chief Judge Korman and I had occasionally opposed each other in the early 1970s, when 
Judge Korman served in the Solicitor General’s Office and I worked on the legal staff of the American 
Civil Liberties Union.  
 26. Two sets of lawyers were involved. One team was headed by Melvyn Weiss and Michael 
Hausfeld. In my opinion, the extraordinary combination of the talents of Mel Weiss and Mike 
Hausfeld go a long way to explaining the success of the Swiss bank litigation. The other legal team 
was led by Robert Swift and Edward Fagan. I was originally asked in December 1996 to participate in 
the Holocaust-related case by Richard Emery, who was at that time a member of the Fagan/Swift team. 
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plaintiffs’ Executive Committee was quickly formed,27 and the Swiss bank 
litigation was vigorously pursued as a classic Rule 23 class action.  
In April 1997, defendants filed a massive set of dismissal motions under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (Rule 12). The dismissal papers and 
supporting material were more than 2,000 pages long. Plaintiffs responded in 
June 1997.28 During the last week in July 1997, at Chief Judge Korman’s 
request, plaintiffs filed a series of four interrelated amended complaints 
clarifying the jurisdictional bases29 and substantive legal theories30 
Morris Ratner, a young partner with Lieff, Cabresser, Heimann & Bernstein who was allied with the 
Weiss/Hausfeld team, played a prominent role in developing the legal issues, as did Irwin Levin and 
Richard Shevitz of the Indianapolis firm of Cohn & Malad. Stephen Whinston, a lawyer with Berger 
and Montague who was allied with the Swift/Fagan team, also played a constructive role in the 
litigation. 
 27. The Executive Committee was structured to give the Weiss/Hausfeld team five votes and the 
Swift/Fagan team four votes, with the tenth vote cast by me. I did not want a tie-breaking vote because 
I did not want to direct the litigation. Instead, I opted for the power to deadlock, banking on the fact 
that as soon as both teams realized that the other could not be excluded, they would work together 
without the need for close votes. That is exactly what happened. Once the Executive Committee was 
organized in February 1997, it no longer became necessary to take close votes on issues. While the 
usual disagreements on strategy and tactics emerged, the disagreements were dealt with by discussion 
and compromise. The one dramatic failure of the Executive Committee occurred during the 
negotiation end-game, when Robert Swift and Edward Fagan publicly announced a willingness to 
accept a $1.25 billion figure that was lower than the $1.5 billion figure set by the Executive 
Committee.  
 28. Memorandum of Law filed on June 16, 1997, in opposition to the defendant banks’ motion to 
dismiss, supra note 4(b).  
 29. The subject matter jurisdictional theories underlying the Swiss litigation are set forth in the 
Memorandum of Law filed on June 16, 1997, supra note 28. The banking claims were premised on 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2002) alienage jurisdiction, since the several named plaintiffs were citizens of the 
United States and the banks were Swiss citizens. Noncitizen plaintiffs were tucked into a deposited 
assets class headed by a U.S. citizen since, under Ben-Hur, the citizenship of a class is measured by 
the citizenship of the named party. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). 
 The international law claims were premised on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
(2002) and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002). See Kadic v. Kradzik, 70 F.3d 232, 
250 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs argued that knowing participation in financing slave labor camps and 
knowing fencing of property looted by Nazis violated customary international law, giving rise to both 
federal question and Alien Tort Claims Act jurisdiction. 
 Given the Swiss banks’ massive presence in New York, no issue of in personam jurisdiction 
existed. The banks did not assert a statute of limitations defense, no doubt fearing that plaintiffs would 
argue that the banks’ behavior in concealing the accounts’ existence had tolled the running of the 
statute of limitations, triggering a hearing in connection with which broad discovery would be almost 
certainly required. Rather than face that discovery, the Swiss banks waived the statute of limitations. 
The banks’ forum non conveniens argument was blunted by the fact that, under Swiss pleading rules, 
the bulk of the bank account cases would be summarily dismissed because the plaintiffs were generally 
unable to specify the particular bank holding the family’s assets. In the United States, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 20(a) (Rule 20(a)) permitted multiple alternative bank defendants to be joined, subject 
to subsequent discovery designed to determine the correct one. Since Rule 20(a) is procedural, 
plaintiffs asserted the law of the forum governed pleading in the American courts, even if Swiss 
substantive law governed the merits.  
 30. Plaintiffs’ substantive legal theories are described at length in the June 16, 1997 
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underlying the Holocaust cases. On August 1, 1997, after a full day of oral 
argument in connection with the complex legal issues raised by the litigation, 
Chief Judge Korman took the matter under advisement. His prolonged 
postargument silence placed significant pressure on both sides to settle.31 
During the ensuing year, the parties, aided by Stuart Eizenstat, 
unsuccessfully discussed settlement with the defendants, who were locked 
into a final offer of $600 million.32 On July 28, 1998, about one year after 
oral argument, Chief Judge Korman reconvened the negotiations. After two 
weeks of continuous bargaining under his supervision, a $1.25 billion 
settlement in principle was reached on August 12, 1998.33  
Memorandum of Law, supra note 4(c). The deposited assets claim was a garden-variety bailment 
issue, complicated by plaintiffs’ argument that, given the circumstances of the deposits, the banks were 
constructive trustees, not mere bailors. The distinction was important, since a constructive trustee 
would be obliged to keep adequate records, make affirmative efforts to return the funds, and be subject 
to punitive damages for willful breaches of trust. The issue was further complicated by the choice-of-
law question, since defendants claimed that neither constructive trust nor punitive damages existed 
under Swiss law. My research into Swiss law suggested that parallel concepts existed, but the case 
never progressed to a stage that required a decision on these issues. 
 The slave labor and looted assets claims were premised on violations of the Nuremberg Principles, 
made enforceable in an American court as a matter of federal common law under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, supra note 29. Plaintiffs pointed to the Nuremberg convictions of Nazi bankers for 
providing knowing financial assistance to Nazi policies that constituted crimes against humanity. 
Defendants argued, inter alia, that the banks were involved in normal banking operations, and that 
international law did not apply to private corporations. 
 31. Although one can never be certain, I believed that Judge Korman’s reaction to the oral 
argument made it likely that, if forced to issue an opinion, he would uphold the claim for bank 
deposits, including the significant claim that the assets were held in constructive trust. At the same 
time, I believed that he might well strike down plaintiffs’ more adventurous claims premised on 
international law. In view of subsequent events, I assume that Judge Korman was quite content to 
leave both parties feeling apprehensive about his final decision.  
 32. I authored an opinion piece in The New York Times explaining why the $600 million offer 
was inadequate. Burt Neuborne, Totaling the Sum of Swiss Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A25. 
 33. The crucial breakthrough occurred on August 11, 1997, when Chief Judge Korman 
persuaded the negotiating parties to meet for a dinner at Gage & Tollner’s restaurant, a Brooklyn 
landmark. At the dinner, Chief Judge Korman asked plaintiffs’ lawyer Michael Hausfeld to explain 
plaintiffs’ estimate of the size of unreturned bank accounts and to reveal certain documentary support 
for his position. Mr. Hausfeld explained that an economic analysis of the flow of funds from Europe 
into Switzerland in the years preceding the Holocaust, together with an analysis of the wealth of 
prewar European Jewry, made clear that a significant proportion of portable Jewish wealth was 
deposited in Swiss accounts immediately prior to the outbreak of World War II. He disclosed an 
internal memo from one bank official to another, dated in 1937, that described large numbers of 
persons lined up outside Swiss banks seeking to place their property in safekeeping. Shortly after Mr. 
Hausfeld’s presentation, Chief Judge Korman suggested $1.25 billion as a settlement amount. Both 
sides accepted the amount in principle the next day. See Settlement in Principle set out in In re 
Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18014 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
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2. The Settlement 
Over the next five months, the settlement in principle was painstakingly 
reduced to writing.34 On January 26, 1999, an elaborate settlement agreement 
involving five classes and a carefully delineated set of beneficiaries was 
signed.35 Five settlement classes were certified: (1) a Deposited Assets class 
of persons seeking the return of funds deposited in Swiss banks; (2) a Slave 
Labor I class of persons who were forced to perform slave labor for Axis-
owned companies that were financially aided by Swiss banks; (3) a Slave 
Labor II class of persons who were forced to perform slave labor directly for 
Swiss companies;36 (4) a Refugee class of persons who had been expelled 
from, been denied entry into, or been mistreated in Switzerland because they 
were Jewish or a member of some other victim group;37 and (5) a Looted 
Assets class of persons whose property had been stolen by the Nazis and 
knowingly fenced through a Swiss bank.  
After conferring with an informal group of advisors consisting of the 
heads of leading Jewish organizations, counsel unanimously insisted that the 
Swiss banks settlement agreement be open to Jews and non-Jews alike. 
 34. Counsel for the Swiss banks insisted that the settlement be a comprehensive resolution of all 
potential Swiss liability for Holocaust-related activity. Accordingly, the five settlement classes track 
the potential theories of liability asserted against various categories of Swiss defendants. The 
nationwide reach of the Swiss settlement made it more politically palatable and permitted the banks to 
take credit for protecting Swiss interests generally. Unlike the German and Austrian governments, 
which provided both political and material assistance to resolving Holocaust-era claims, the Swiss 
government provided no support for the settlement.  
 The Swiss banks required every major Jewish organization in the world to endorse the settlement 
in writing as a precondition to going forward.  Obtaining the endorsements accounted for at least a 
portion of the five-month lag between the agreement in principle on August 12, 1997, and the formal 
signing of a settlement agreement on January 26, 1999. 
 35. A helpful summary of the settlement agreement was prepared by Special Master Gribetz in 
connection with his development of a plan of allocation and distribution. The summary is set forth as 
an appendix to the Symposium Issue of the Fordham International Law Journal dedicated to the Swiss 
bank settlement. See Symposium, Holocaust Restitution, supra note 1.  
 36. During the negotiations, the defendants repeatedly represented that the Slave Labor II class 
would be very small, since very few Swiss companies had used slave labor. See In re Holocaust 
Victim Assets Litig., 2001 WL 419967 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2001). As the administration of the 
settlement unfolded, the size of the Slave Labor II class grew to more than 500 companies, with at 
least 11,000 “employees.” The parties are continuing to litigate the precise scope of the Slave Labor II 
class to determine whether so-called “after-acquired” companies that were German-owned during 
World War II, but were acquired by Swiss entities after the war, should be treated as Swiss or German 
companies. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 282 F.3d 103 92d Cir. 2002. 
 37. Sovereign immunity would have made it impossible to pursue claims arising out of its World 
War II immigration policies against Switzerland in an American court. That is why the United States 
has not been held liable for its appalling World War II immigration policies. The Refugee class was 
added at the insistence of the Swiss negotiators, presumably in response to Swiss judicial decisions 
indicating that Jewish refugees could pursue claims in Swiss courts. See Neuborne Declaration dated 
June 2000, supra note 4(d), at 8-9. 
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Accordingly, membership in the Deposited Assets, Slave Labor I, Refugee, 
and Looted Assets classes was opened to five categories of victims deemed 
to be core targets of Nazi racial and religious ideology: Jews, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Sinti-Roma (gypsies), homosexuals, and the disabled. Slave 
Labor II membership was universal, including victims of national origin 
persecution and political persecution.38  
Since no good deed goes unpunished, Chief Judge Korman appointed me 
as Lead Settlement Counsel on February 1, 1999, appointing the other 
members of the Executive Committee as cosettlement counsel. Settlement 
counsel unanimously adopted a bifurcated approach to the administration of 
the settlement agreement. 
Phase I consisted of a massive, worldwide notice program designed to 
inform Holocaust victims of the contours of the settlement and of their right 
to opt out, followed by a fairness hearing under Rule 23(e). Phase II 
consisted of the appointment of a Special Master to develop and recommend 
a plan of allocation and distribution for consideration by the District Court at 
a second Rule 23(e) hearing.39  
The bifurcated procedure posed several concerns. First, by structuring the 
opt-out procedure as part of the Phase I process, class members were asked 
to decide whether to opt out before they knew the precise details of the 
allocation plan. Second, by using a Special Master, plaintiffs hoped, despite 
the holding in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,40 to avoid the appointment 
of separate counsel for each settlement class and the subsequent classic 
adversary struggle over allocation.  
Both the early opt out41 and the decision to avoid separate counsel for 
each settlement class were designed to minimize the emergence of 
contentious arguments between and among potentially competing categories 
of Holocaust survivors for access to the limited $1.25 billion fund. It would, I 
believe, have been a tragedy of epic proportions if the Swiss bank Holocaust 
litigation had degenerated into an adversarial free-for-all among categories of 
surviving victims, each seeking a share of the pittance available. A more 
 38. The Second Circuit rejected an effort by Polish victims to challenge the exclusion of national 
origin victims from the four principal settlement classes, holding that the excluded categories of 
victims remained free to bring their own litigation. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191 
(2d Cir. 2000). The case is significant in holding that no attorney-client relationship exists between 
counsel for named plaintiffs and putative class members prior to the certification of an actual class. 
 39. For a defense of the two phases of implementation, see Neuborne Declarations submitted in 
support of Fairness of the Settlement, supra note 4(d). 
 40. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The implications for Amchem are discussed later, infra Part III.C. 
 41. In In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litig., 818 F.2d (2d Cir. 1987), the Second Circuit had 
upheld an early opt out in settings where it would be impossible to ascertain the precise recovery. 
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dignified and mutually respectful plan of allocation was imperative.42 
Instead of resorting to a classic adversarial proceeding, settlement counsel 
sought to construct the settlement classes into ad hoc political entities with 
the attributes of “exit, loyalty, and voice.”43 During Phase I, settlement 
counsel provided all Holocaust survivors with careful notice of the general 
contour of the settlement and a description of the procedure for developing a 
fair allocation plan, asking them to be bound by a fair process instead of 
waiting for a particular outcome. In short, settlement class members were 
asked to bind themselves to a process rather than an outcome, or to opt out of 
the settlement. Of the 580,000 written responses to the notice materials 
received by settlement counsel, fewer than 300 persons elected to opt out.  
After a massive notice program involving mailings to more than 1 million 
persons and the receipt of questionnaires from 580,000 persons,44 Phase I 
Rule 23(e) fairness hearings were held in Brooklyn and Jerusalem on 
November 29 and December 14, 1999, respectively.45 The hearings 
concerned the basic fairness of the settlement and the proposed procedures 
for developing a plan of allocation.46 While the overwhelming response of 
the plaintiff classes was positive, troubling criticism was leveled at several 
aspects of the settlement, including the mechanism for obtaining the 
information needed to administer it. Additional extensive negotiations were 
required during the first half of 2000 to deal with the issues raised at the 
fairness hearings. Most importantly, the parties discussed assuring access to 
information in the possession of Swiss banks that was needed to administer 
 42. See Neuborne Declaration dated November 1999, supra note 4(d), at 20-21, for a discussion 
of counsel’s desire to avoid pitting one set of Holocaust survivors against another. 
 43. I have lodged a declaration filed with Chief Judge Korman in support of the settlement’s 
fairness setting forth the elements of “exit, loyalty, and voice.” A copy of the declaration is on file with 
the Law Quarterly, see supra note 4(d). Professor John Coffee has invoked the concepts, drawn from 
political theory, to describe the post-Amchem structure of a complex class action. John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000). 
 44. My colleague, Morris Ratner, provided invaluable assistance to the plaintiff classes by 
organizing and supervising the massive and complex worldwide notice program. 
 45. I filed three declarations with the Court in my capacity as Lead Settlement Counsel urging 
acceptance of the basic settlement agreement as fair. I noted that the settlement amount of $1.25 
billion was not adequate to compensate plaintiffs for the injuries that they had suffered. Nevertheless, I 
argued the settlement amount reflected the limitations of the real world and should be accepted as a 
fair compromise. I defended the bifurcated settlement procedure as both pragmatically necessary and 
fundamentally fair. I noted that principles of “exit, loyalty, and voice” provided adequate protection to 
all class members.  
 Objections to the settlement generally took the form of concerns over adequacy of the settlement 
amount, objections to the bifurcated procedure, concerns that the separate counsel were not appointed 
for each settlement class, and premature concerns over fair distribution. See Neuborne Declaration, 
supra note 4(d). 
 46. See supra note 45. 
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the settlement agreement fairly, and they developed the means to pay for the 
elaborate bank account claims process, known as CRT II.47  
The fairness of the Phase II allocation process depended on the existence 
of a neutral Special Master, Judah Gribetz, and the pledge by all settlement 
counsel that they would assist all Holocaust survivors, regardless of 
category.48 Counsel agreed to present information and argument to the 
Special Master concerning allocation and to assist him in developing a plan 
of allocation and distribution.49 The process could not work without a Special 
Master as extraordinary as Judah Gribetz. 
Finally, on July 26, 2000, Chief Judge Korman approved the amended 
Swiss bank settlement agreement as fair and delegated to Special Master 
Judah Gribetz the responsibility for developing a fair plan of allocation and 
distribution.50 Multiple appeals were filed from Chief Judge Korman’s final 
order and judgment, upholding the fairness of the settlement. The appeals 
challenged (1) the adequacy of the settlement amount, especially in the light 
of the findings in the Volcker Committee Report; (2) the bifurcated 
settlement procedure, especially the failure to have appointed separate 
counsel for each settlement class; and (3) the failure to have achieved an 
insurance settlement. The principal appeal was initially dismissed by the 
 47. The issue of funding the CRT II process was resolved by accelerating the final installment 
payments due from the Swiss banks in order to generate additional interest that could be used to fund 
the CRT II process. Delivery of the final installment of $334 million was accelerated from November 
23, 2001, to November 23, 2000, in order to generate the necessary interest. Negotiations dealt, as 
well, with technical amendments to the Settlement Agreement governing the return of looted art, 
explicitly permitting replevin actions either in the country where the art is located or in the country 
from which art had been stolen. Negotiations also concerned rules for access to data needed to 
administer a bank accounts claims program and the establishment of a very modest insurance claims 
process involving the two cooperating Swiss insurers—Swiss Re and Swiss Life. No releases will be 
provided to noncooperating Swiss insurance companies. The new provisions are set forth in 
Amendment 2 of the Settlement Agreement, supra note 4(a). 
 48. Since the principal counsel had waived fees, no structural conflicts related to fees precluded 
counsel from serving the needs of all survivors, regardless of which settlement class they fell into. 
 49. The basic contours of the allocation plan were upheld by the Second Circuit. In re Holocaust 
ssets Litig., No. 00-9595 (2d Cir. July 26, 2001).  A 50. In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp.2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). In order to 
assure the orderly administration of the Slave Labor II class, Judge Korman ordered all Swiss entities 
seeking a release under Slave Labor II to identify themselves to the Court within a reasonable period 
of time. The defendants eventually challenged the self-identification requirement, but the belated 
appeal was dismissed as untimely. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 282 F.3d 103, 105 (2d 
Cir. 2002), for reference to the belated appeal. As of November 2002, the parties were still at odds 
over the precise membership of the Slave Labor II class, disagreeing over whether a company must 
have been Swiss-owned during the war to qualify for an unlimited Slave Labor II release. See supra 
note 36. Chief Judge Korman recused himself on remand and the matter was randomly assigned to 
Judge Frederick Block. See Case No. CV-02-3314(FB) (related to Case No. CV-02-2981(FB)). The 
parties are also in disagreement over whether funds in the Swiss settlement escrow fund earn simple or 
complex interest. Approximately $4 million is at issue. See Case No. CV-02-2981 (FB) 
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Second Circuit for failure to adhere to the Circuit’s appellate schedule.51 
Inexplicably, the appeal was reinstated and persisted until approximately 
May 15, 2001, when it was withdrawn. The Second Circuit granted the 
motion to withdraw the appeal and issued its mandate on May 30, 2001, 
ending all legal challenges to the basic settlement structure.  
3. The Special Master’s Plan 
Over a period of more than a year after Judge Korman’s order approving 
the fairness of the settlement, Special Master Gribetz conducted an intensive 
investigation into the legal and factual basis for the claims of the five 
settlement classes and conferred personally with literally hundreds of class 
members who wished to be heard. At the close of the process, he issued a 
two-volume report in September 2000 that summarized the history of 
Holocaust reparations, assessed the legal and factual claims of the various 
categories of claimants, and recommended a plan of allocation and 
distribution.52 The Special Master based his plan primarily on (1) the relative 
legal and factual strengths and weaknesses of the respective legal claims of 
the settlement classes and (2) the potential for administering each class in a 
fair and efficient manner. The Special Master’s Report found that the claim 
for the return of Holocaust-era bank deposits was the legal heart of the case.53 
Accordingly, he recommended allocating up to $800 million to pay bank 
deposit claims; approximately $200 to $300 million to pay Slave Labor I and 
II claims, in the form of payments of $1,000 to each surviving slave laborer; 
and $100 million for Looted Assets claims, to be administered cy pres to aid 
the poorest survivors.54 Individual administration of the Looted Assets class 
was deemed impossible because of the difficulty in tracing particular looted 
property to a Swiss bank and the enormous number of persons who suffered 
looting.55 The Special Master’s choice of a $1,000 payment to surviving 
slave and forced laborers (subsequently increased to $1,450) was influenced 
by the payment of 15,000 DM (approximately $7,500) to many of the same 
persons by the German Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the 
Future” (the German Foundation).56 Finally, the Special Master 
recommended that refugees denied access to Switzerland during WWII 
because of membership in a defined victim group were to receive a sliding 
 51. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29529 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2000). 
 52. See Special Master Gribetz’s Proposed Plan of Allocation, supra note 4(f). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 8, 11-12. 
 55. See Special Master Gribetz’ Proposed Plan of Allocation, supra note 4(f), at 22-23. 
 56. See supra note 3; see infra notes 86-103 and accompanying text. 
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scale of payments topping out at $2,500.57  
After a second round of notice and a second set of hearings, Chief Judge 
Korman approved the Special Master’s proposed plan of allocation and 
distribution on November 22, 2000.58 The Second Circuit upheld both the 
definition of the plaintiff classes, and the plan of allocation and distribution 
adopted by the District Court.59  
Distribution of the $1.25 billion Swiss bank settlement fund is currently 
underway.60 
4. The German Slave Labor Cases 
Shortly after the August 1, 1997, oral argument in the Swiss bank case, I 
became aware of a potentially significant decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court in Krakauer v. Federal Republic of Germany,61 
abrogating the temporary immunity from suit for claims arising out of World 
War II (WWII) that had been granted to German industry by the London 
Debt Agreement of 1953.62 Accordingly, in September and October 1997, I 
 57. A copy of the document filed by the Special Master with the District Court describing the 
allocation plan in detail is annexed as an appendix to the 2001 Fordham International Law Journal 
Symposium Issue on the Swiss banks litigation. See Symposium, Holocaust Restitution, supra note 1.  
 58. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 WL 33241660 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).  
 59. See In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., supra note 38 (upholding class definition); In re 
Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation, 2001 WL 868507 (2d Cir. July 26, 2001) (upholding plan of 
allocation). Several additional appeals were withdrawn after the filing of briefs on the merits. 
 60. Current distribution is described supra at pages 799-804. 
 61. Krakauer v. Fed. Republic of Germany, LG (trial court) Bonn, 1* 134/92 (1997) (FRG), 
rev’d on other grounds, OLG [Court of Appeals] Cologne, 7 U. 222/97 (1998) (FRG)). I owe a debt to 
Deborah Sturman, whose knowledge of German reparations practice enabled me to understand the 
significant of the Krakauer opinion. The German slave labor litigation owes a good deal to her 
persistence in bringing the Krakauer case to the attention of counsel. 
 62. Inadequate recognition has been paid to the fact that the German judiciary’s voluntary action 
in Krakauer opened the way to significant compensation for Holocaust survivors.  
 The London Debt Agreement of 1953 was, in effect, an international bankruptcy workout plan for 
postwar West German industry, deferring judicial consideration of liability for wartime behavior until 
the negotiation of a peace treaty at some indefinite time in the future. By 1953, the international 
community had realized that an economically viable West Germany was a crucial link in Cold War 
efforts to contain Soviet expansion. The fear was that immediate imposition of liability for wartime 
actions would make it impossible for a strong postwar German economy to flourish. The London Debt 
Agreement was designed to defer liability until the signing of a formal peace treaty, at which time 
West German industry would be stronger and the precise details of reparations could be provided for 
in the treaty. Unfortunately for Holocaust victims, the Cold War made it impossible to complete a 
peace treaty with Germany, rendering the deferral of German industrial liability for wartime actions 
virtually permanent. The 1991 Two-Plus-Four Treaty, supra note 69, that paved the way for German 
reunification, was as close to a peace treaty as the Allies managed to achieve. The importance of the 
Krakauer opinion was its recognition that the deferral provisions of the London Debt Agreement had 
been lifted by the signing of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which was treated by the German Court as a 
de facto peace treaty. 
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conducted extensive research in connection with efforts to secure relief for 
Holocaust victims who had been compelled to perform slave labor for 
German companies during WWII. By February 1998, the plaintiffs had 
completed research in connection with the slave labor issue. In March 1998, 
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., the first slave labor case filed against German 
industry, was filed before Judge Greenaway in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey.63 Numerous additional slave labor cases 
were filed against a series of major German companies in the ensuing three 
months.64  
Plaintiffs argued that the London Debt Agreement’s grant of temporary 
immunity from suit to German industry had acted to toll the running of the 
applicable statutes of limitations. With the lifting of that temporary immunity 
in Krakauer, plaintiffs argued that German corporate defendants became 
liable under both German law and principles of international law for having 
knowingly reaped huge profits by using slave and forced labor during WWII. 
Plaintiffs’ German law claims were garden-variety contract and unjust 
enrichment claims, seeking compensation for the reasonable value of their 
coerced services and appropriate compensation for suffering caused by 
wretched conditions of confinement.65 Plaintiffs’ international law claims 
were premised on customary international law prohibiting the enslavement of 
conquered populations and on the Nurmberg Principles barring the 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.66 
Defendants argued that the German law claims were barred by the two-
year statute of limitations governing employment contracts,67 and that 
 63. Iwanowa, supra note 2. 
 64. All told, fifty-four slave labor cases were filed against German industrial defendants. Most of 
the slave labor complaints were modeled on the Iwanowa complaint. In re Nazi Era Cases Against 
German Defendants Litig. (Frumkin) 129 F. Supp.2d 370 (2001). 
 65. For a further discussion of Plaintiffs’ legal arguments, see the Brief of Apellants, on appeal to 
the Thrird Circuit Court of Appeals, supra note 4(c). 
 66. G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946). 
 67. Defendants argued that even if the German statute of limitations was tolled during the period 
of deferral imposed by the London Debt Agreement, the statute began to run in 1991 with the signing 
of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, supra note 69. Plaintiffs argued that the earliest the statute of limitations 
could begin to run was in 1996, when the Krakauer decision was announced. Plaintiffs also argued 
that the applicable statute of limitations was the twenty-year statute governing unjust enrichment, or, at 
the least, the six-year statute governing tort. 
 Defendants also challenged the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs’ international law claims, and the 
subject matter jurisdiction of an American court to grant relief against German defendants. See Brief 
of Appellants, on appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, supra note 4(c). See also German Civil 
Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch) § 195 (30 year statute of limitations); § 196(1)(9) (two year statute of 
limitations); Bartl v. Heinkel, BGHZ [Supreme Court] 48 (1967) (F.R.G.). Compare Iwanowa, supra 
note 2, at 476-83. 
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international law claims involving war reparations were nonjusticiable.68  
After an exchange of voluminous briefs and supporting documents, oral 
argument in the German company slave labor cases took place before Judge 
Greenaway in March 1999 and August 1999 and before Judge Debevoise in 
August 1999.  
On September 13, 1999, both Judge Greenaway and Judge Debevoise 
dismissed the first series of German slave labor cases on the ground that the 
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (the Two-Plus-Four 
Treaty)69 had impliedly abrogated slave labor claims against German 
companies arising under international law. Moreover, held the New Jersey 
federal courts, the German law claims were barred by a shockingly short 
two-year limitations period governing employment contracts.70 Plaintiffs 
immediately pursued a series of expedited appeals to the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals, arguing that the district courts had erroneously interpreted the 
Two-Plus-Four Treaty and had misapplied German limitations law. Plaintiffs 
argued that the silence in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty concerning slave labor 
claims could not possibly be read as an implied destruction of the claims, 
especially in view of the earlier deferral of the claims by the London 
Agreement on Germany’s External Debts (the London Debt Agreement). 
Silence in the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, argued the plaintiffs, merely returned 
the parties to the position they had been in immediately prior to the London 
Debt Agreement.71  
The appeals were adjourned by Chief Judge Becker on June 15, 2000, on 
the eve of oral argument, in light of the imminent establishment of the 
German Foundation as an alternative to litigation. The slave labor appeals 
were ultimately voluntarily dismissed in May 2001 in connection with the 
establishment of the German Foundation.  
While the slave labor cases were not litigated to completion, their 
vigorous prosecution against a broad array of German companies played a 
 68. I have lodged with the Law Quarterly the Third Circuit brief in Iwanowa, containing 
plaintiffs’ legal arguments on the merits, and on the jurisdictional issues. See supra note 4(c). 
 69. Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany (with Agreed Minute), Sept. 12, 
1990, 1696 U.N.T.S. 124. 
 70. Burger-Fischer, supra note 2; Iwanowa, supra note 2.  
 Judge Greenaway’s particularly disturbing holding that German law claims were barred by a two-
year statute of limitations governing employment contracts purported to be required by a similarly 
shocking decision by the German courts in the mid 1950s applying a two-year statute of limitations to 
wartime slave labor claims. Burger-Fischer, supra. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to persuade Judge 
Greenaway that modern German academic analysis recognizes that a much longer statute of limitations 
governs claims for World War II involuntary labor. Id. Apparently confused by German legal practice, 
which does not recognize the principle of stare decisis, Judge Greenaway deemed himself bound by 
the earlier decision, even though a German court would have been free to have disregarded. Id.  
 
 71. Abkommen über deutsche Auslandsschulden, v. 27.2. 1953 (BaB1.II S.333). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p795 Neuborne book pages.doc1/13/2003   12:30 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
816 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:795 
 
 
 
 
 
major role in persuading German industry to establish the significant German 
Foundation to pay compensation to Holocaust victims.72 Unfortunately, the 
erroneous—at least to me—decisions of the District Court in dismissing the 
slave labor claims as time-barred and nonjusticiable eroded the bargaining 
position of counsel, reducing the sums ultimately available to victims by as 
much as DM 5 billion.73  
B. The Austrian Bank Litigation 
I believe that Chief Judge Korman has handled the Swiss bank litigation 
as a model Rule 23 proceeding. Unfortunately, despite Judge Kram’s earnest 
efforts, the same cannot be said for the Austrian bank litigation. In the wake 
of the Swiss bank settlement, several overlapping complaints were filed 
against Bank Austria Creditanstalt seeking relief against Austrian banks on 
behalf of Holocaust victims.74 In contrast to the approach utilized by Chief 
Judge Korman in the Swiss bank cases, Judge Kram, before whom both the 
German and the Austrian bank cases were ultimately consolidated, did not 
seek to establish an Executive Committee representing all counsel in the 
several, overlapping cases pending before her. Instead, she appointed former 
 72. Shortly after oral argument in the Swiss bank cases in August 1997, litigation was 
commenced by several sets of lawyers against German banks and German insurance companies on 
behalf of Holocaust victims. I played virtually no role in the litigation, except to secure voluntary 
dismissal. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text for a description of the complex mandamus 
proceedings that preceded dismissal of the German bank cases. 
 73. Although it has nothing to do with formal law, the strategic judgment of Chief Judge Korman 
to withhold decision in the Swiss case, thus putting inexorable pressure on the parties to settle, should 
be contrasted with the decision by judgment of Judges Debevoise and Greenaway to dismiss the 
German slave labor cases while the German Foundation negotiations were underway.  
 German industry and the German government initially expressed serious interest in a German 
Foundation as an alternative to litigation in early 1999, shortly before the argument of the Iwanowa 
case. During the next eighteen months, negotiations concerning the German Foundation proceeded on 
a parallel track to the slave labor litigation, with the temperature of the negotiations fluctuating 
depending upon signals flashed by the litigation. The obvious interest in the case shown by Judges 
Greenaway and Debevoise provided a significant spur to German industry. If no decision had been 
announced, the parties would, I believe, have replicated the Swiss experience and reached agreement 
at a figure to fund the German Foundation that would have approximated DM 15 billion. The 
dismissals poured ice water on plaintiffs negotiating position, despite efforts to establish a bold front 
by seeking expedited appeals and asking the United States to opine on the meaning of the Two-Plus-
Four Treaty, supra note 69.    
 It is possible to defend the dismissals by arguing that the adverse decisions were necessary to 
force plaintiffs’ counsel to adopt a realistic settlement figure. It is no coincidence that the DM 10 
billion figure was agreed upon in December 1999, three months after the dismissals and immediately 
after plaintiffs filed the expedited appeal papers. It is also possible to defend the dismissals as 
principled acts by an independent judiciary that should remain aloof from the pragmatic issues 
surrounding the parties’ negotiations.  
 74. See, e.g., Elkan v. Creditanstalt, CV 98-6996 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).  
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Senator Alfonse D’Amato, who had consistently sought to assist Holocaust 
victims during his years in public life,75 as a Special Master charged with 
exploring settlement.  
In the absence of a unified Executive Committee, counsel for the Austrian 
banks was able to conduct a classic “negative auction,” probing each 
overlapping plaintiffs’ lawyer to identify the one lawyer willing to accept the 
lowest settlement terms on behalf of a settlement class. In March 1999, the 
negative auction process culminated in a decision by certain counsel, headed 
by Edward Fagan and Robert Swift, to accept a payment of $40 million to an 
Austrian bank settlement class in satisfaction of all claims by Holocaust 
victims against Austrian banks.76  
In an effort to make the $40 million cash payment appear more palatable, 
the Austrian banks executed the so-called “Austrian assignment,” an 
assignment of all claims which they purportedly possessed against German 
banks, primarily Deutsche Bank and Dresdener Bank, for the alleged looting 
and mismanagement of Austrian banks during the Nazi era.77  
The Austrian assignment was described to Judge Kram and to Special 
Master D’Amato as providing a significant economic enhancement to the 
$40 million cash payment. For example, an employee of counsel for the 
defendant banks testified as a witness for both the plaintiffs and the 
defendants at the Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, stating that the securities 
involved in claims underlying the Austrian assignment were currently valued 
at $300 million.78  
On January 6, 2000, Judge Kram upheld the Austrian bank settlement’s 
fairness under Rule 23(e), relying in part on the representations to her that the 
Austrian assignment provided additional economic value to the settlement 
class.79 The Second Circuit affirmed the finding of fairness, also relying on 
representations that the Austrian assignment added value to the cash 
settlement.80 
 75. As Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, Senator D’Amato was instrumental in urging 
both Swiss and German banks to deal justly with their Holocaust-era obligations. Senator D’Amato 
participated in the final day of negotiations in the Swiss banks case, aiding the parties in reaching 
agreement on the interest issue.  
 76. As initially negotiated, the Austrian bank settlement contemplated payment of $30 million to 
the class, with $10 million set aside for administrative costs and attorneys’ fees. Austrian Bank 
Settlement, supra note 4. 
 77. See Austrian bank settlement, supra note 4(h). 
 78. See Transcript of the Fairness Hearing in front of Judge Kram in November 1999, supra note 
4(i), at 4-118. 
  80. D’Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001).  79. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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Unfortunately, the Austrian assignment was legally worthless on the day 
it was made because the causes of action underlying the Austrian assignment 
had been explicitly extinguished by the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which 
abrogated all legal claims of Austrians against Germans arising out of the 
Nazi era.81 Moreover, it appears that the defendant banks knew, at the very 
moment the claims were being touted to Judge Kram as economically 
valuable, that the Austrian assignment claims had been extinguished by 
treaty some forty-five years earlier.82  
Given the text of the Austrian State Treaty, it has proven impossible to 
enforce the claims underlying the Austrian assignment in any forum. The 
German Foundation refused to honor claims premised solely on the Austrian 
assignment because the claims are legally worthless. Judge Kram’s 
appointment of special counsel to enforce the Austrian assignment ended in 
fiasco, with the court-appointed counsel seeking leave to discontinue his 
action in large part because the Austrian Ambassador to the United States 
had confirmed that the claims had been extinguished by treaty.83 Judge Kram 
was left with the unenviable option of seeking to pressure the German 
Foundation to set aside funds to pay claims premised solely on the Austrian 
assignment despite the legal invalidity of the underlying claims. Her last 
ditch effort to salvage the Austrian assignment by holding the German 
Foundation hostage until it agreed to pay a ransom to holders of the Austrian 
assignment ended in the issuance of writ of mandamus by the Second Circuit 
directing her to let the German Foundation go.84 The $40 million cash 
settlement has not yet been distributed.85 
 81. The operative language of Article 23(3) of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 provides: 
Austria waives on its own behalf and on behalf of all Austrian nationals all claims against 
Germany and German nationals outstanding on 8th May 1945, except those arising out of contract 
and other obligations entered into, and rights acquired, before 13th March 1938. This waiver shall 
be deemed to include all claims in respect of transactions effected by Germany during the period 
of the annexation of Austria and all claims in respect of loss or damage suffered during the said 
period. 
See U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements in Force, 6 U.S.T. 2408, 2432. 
 82. For example, at the apparent behest of defendants, the Austrian bank settlement agreement 
was amended on May 14, 1999, to negate any warranty that the Austrian assignment of claims had 
value under Austrian law. In addition, officials of Bank Austria have publicly admitted that they knew 
the claims were valueless even as they assigned them to the Austrian settlement class. See Austrian 
bank settlement, supra note 4(h). 
 83. See Order with transcript dated May 21, 2001, supra note 4(k). 
 84. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 250 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 85. See infra Part III.D.2. 
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C. The Establishment of the German Foundation  
1. Negotiating a Structure 
In late January 1999, on the eve of oral argument in Iwanowa, the 
German Foundation Industrial Initiative, a consortium of seventeen major 
German corporations,86 announced a willingness to seek a negotiated 
resolution of all Holocaust-related litigation against German companies. In 
early February 1999, German Chancellor Schroeder announced the 
willingness of the German government to contribute to a just settlement of 
Holocaust-related claims against German defendants. On March 8, 1999, 
cocounsel Mel Weiss and I presented oral argument before Judge Greenaway 
in Iwanowa. The District Court’s careful questioning made it clear that the 
litigation was being taken very seriously. 
The German defendants responded. In early March, immediately after 
oral argument in Iwanowa, the United States and Germany convened an 
international negotiation involving eight nations,87 representatives of German 
industry,88 nongovernmental organizations representing Holocaust victims,89 
 86. The following German corporations are founding members of the German Industrial 
Initiative: Allianz AG; BASF AG, Bayer AG, BMW AG, Commerzbank AG, DaimlerChrysler AG, 
Degussa-Huls AG, Deutsche Bank AG, Deutz AG, Dresdener Bank AG, Hoechst AG, RAG AG, 
Robert Bosch GmbH, Siemens AG, VEBA AG, ThyssenKrupp AG, and Volkswagen AG.  
 87. In addition to Germany and the United States, the negotiators included representatives of the 
governments of Israel, Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, the Ukraine, and Belarus. The United 
States delegation was headed by Stuart E. Eizenstat, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. The German 
delegation was initially headed by Bodo Hambach. Leadership of the German delegation was 
ultimately assumed by Otto Graf Lambsdorff, a past German Minister of Finance, whose efforts were 
instrumental in reaching agreement. Stuart Eizenstat and Graf Lambsdorff were tireless in keeping the 
discussion alive and in finding ways to bridge seemingly irreconcilable differences. Helpful technical 
assistance was provided to the negotiations by demographers at the University of Florence who helped 
in estimating the number of Holocaust-survivors in various countries. 
 88. German industry was represented by the German Industrial Initiative, headed by Dr. Manfred 
Genz, Chief Financial Officer of Daimler-Chrysler. Dr. Genz, a skilled and tenacious negotiator, 
deserves credit for persuading German industry to support the German Foundation, and for his tireless 
efforts in raising funds from German industry to meet the DM 5 billion commitment. Of course, it did 
not hurt that the industry contribution to the German Foundation was tax deductible, resulting in a net 
40% savings for each contribution. In fact, German taxpayers shouldered approximately 70% of the 
cost of the German Foundation.  
 The German Industrial Initiative was represented by Roger Witten, of Wilmer, Cutler & 
Pickering, whose imaginative approach to many issues provided valuable guidance. Mr. Witten also 
represented the Swiss banks in the Swiss bank litigation and deserves credit for evolving the idea of a 
German Foundation, reinforced by an Executive Agreement between Germany and the United States, 
as the primary vehicle for the German settlement.  
 89. The principal nongovernmental organization was the Conference on Jewish Material Claims 
Against Germany (the “Claims Conference”), an umbrella organization representing most established 
Jewish organizations, which, since the early 1950s, had negotiated with Germany on behalf of 
Diaspora Jewry concerning material losses caused by the Holocaust. See www.claimscon.com for 
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and several lawyers representing Holocaust victims.90 Negotiations under the 
joint auspices of Germany and the United States continued for the next 
eighteen months, rotating between Bonn, Germany, and Washington, D.C., 
on a monthly basis.91 
The negotiations passed through four phases. During the Spring and early 
Summer of 1999, the parties discussed the form of a possible settlement. By 
the summer of 1999, the negotiating parties had reached agreement that a 
nonjudicial German Foundation would be preferable to a traditional Rule 23 
settlement class in order to provide expeditious relief to the many thousands 
of Holocaust victims who were not in a position to sue a wartime German 
defendant, either because (1) the defendant no longer existed; (2) the 
further information about the Claims Conference. Representatives of victims’ organizations in several 
Eastern European countries also participated.  
 90. The principal spokesman for the American lawyers was Melvyn I. Weiss, whose candid 
observations repeatedly punctured the posturing of the diplomats and the German negotiators. Weiss 
made it clear that talk about charity and humanitarianism was self-serving nonsense. According to 
Weiss, self-interest, driven by fear of the American courts, was the engine that drove the negotiations. 
Michael Hausfeld and I also played substantial roles during the discussions. Other American lawyers 
who participated constructively were Morris Ratner, Richard Shevitz, Irwin Levin, Robert Swift, 
Steven Whinston, Larry Kill, and Edward Fagan. Deborah Sturman provided valuable assistance to 
plaintiffs’ negotiating team, repeatedly drawing on her knowledge of German law and society. 
 91. This is not the forum for an analysis of the extraordinary dynamics of the negotiations that 
culminated in the establishment of the German Foundation. The mixture of domestic and international 
concerns, coupled with the mix of public and private actors, rendered the negotiations unique. In 
particular, the direct participation of lawyers acting as classic advocates for specific clients in 
discussions between and among sovereign nations culminated in a hybrid “settlement” consisting of: 
(1) the establishment of a DM 10 billion German public foundation to aid Holocaust victims; (2) the 
signing of a formal Executive Agreement between Germany and the United States relating to future 
Holocaust-related litigation; and (3) the voluntary dismissal of numerous Holocaust-related actions 
pending in U.S. courts in return for the establishment of the German Foundation. It has already been 
the subject of one somewhat critical article, Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s 
Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept./Oct. 2000), and will doubtless be the subject of additional 
discussion. See also Daniel Wise, Diplomacy Met Lawyering in Historic Pact, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 2000. 
 One obvious issue raised by the participation of lawyers representing clients in the German 
negotiations leading to the establishment of the German Foundation is whether the rigid conflict of 
interest rules governing the behavior of lawyers representing clients in an adversarial proceeding must 
be strictly adhered to in the complex give-and-take of an international negotiation involving sovereign 
entities and presided over by the Executive branch of the U.S. government. Allegations have been 
made that certain lawyers representing Austrian bank claimants were too willing to compromise during 
the international negotiations in order to advance the interests of Holocaust victims generally, rather 
than play traditional “hold-up” games designed to advance the interests of the particular category of 
Holocaust victims whom they represented. The allegations have ripened into an effort to force those 
lawyers who represented Austrian bank claimants and also participated in the international 
negotiations to forfeit all fees awarded in connection with the establishment of the German Foundation 
as a penalty for having placed themselves in a conflict-of-interest situation. The trial court dismissed 
the forfeiture motion on separation of powers grounds, ruling that the courts lacked power to use the 
disciplinary rules to second-guess the outcome of complex international negotiations presided over by 
the Executive branch. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15573 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). An appeal is pending in the Second Circuit.   
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defendant was a government instrumentality shielded by sovereign 
immunity; or (3) they lacked access to legal resources.92 A nonjudicial 
vehicle was also thought to provide a speedier means of placing funds in the 
hands of victims with lower transaction costs and less chance of strategic 
delay.93  
2. Negotiating the Form of the Settlement 
Once agreement on form was reached, the parties negotiated vigorously 
over the size of the German Foundation fund. On December 14, 1999, after 
 92. One obvious issue raised by the choice of a nonjudicial mechanism for administering the 
settlement is whether the allocation and administration phases of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
(Rule 23) class action can routinely be delegated to a nonjudicial entity capable of acting with 
efficiency and flexibility in distributing assets to beneficiaries. The wisdom of choosing a nonjudicial 
distribution mechanism is demonstrated by the speed with which the German Foundation has 
distributed more than 2.7 billion Euros to 850,000 persons in little more than one year. No judicially 
administered mechanism could have matched the speed of distribution. If the classic Rule 23 route had 
been chosen, I suspect that we would still be embroiled in litigation over fairness and allocation.  
 On the other hand, there is no ongoing American judicial check on the activities of the German 
Foundation to assure fairness and compliance with the obligations imposed by the settlement 
documents. For example, plaintiffs’ claim that German industry has failed to pay the full interest due 
on its principal obligation must be litigated in an independent plenary proceeding, perhaps before a 
German court, as opposed to being routinely referred to a Rule 23 supervising judge. Plaintiffs are 
seeking to litigate the interest issue in the District of New Jersey. Gross v. The German Found. 
Industrial Initiative, MDL No. 1337, DNJ Lead Civ. No. 98-4104 (WGB). 
 Counsel, conscious of the potentially controversial nature of shifting the administration of the 
settlement to a nonjudicial German Foundation, provided that the basic fairness of the settlement must 
be passed upon by an Article III judge prior to the voluntary dismissal of the pending cases. Judge 
William G. Bassler performed that difficult function with great distinction in connection with the slave 
labor cases. See In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., supra note 64; In re Nazi Era 
Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000). The procedure almost 
backfired when Judge Kram, concerned over the failure of the German Foundation to pay claims under 
the Austrian assignment, declined to grant permission to dismiss the German banking cases. In re 
Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2311 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2001), 
necessitating a writ of mandamus from the Second Circuit. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust 
Litig. supra note 79. See also infra text accompanying notes 109-14.  
 Judge Kram’s effort to force the German Foundation to recognize claims under the Austrian 
assignment delayed the establishment of the Foundation for approximately six months. The parties are 
now bitterly divided over whether German industry is obliged to pay interest as a result of the 
unexpected delay in payment.  
 93. The negotiators were aware that although the Swiss settlement had been signed on January 
26, 1999, as of the signing of the Berlin Accords in July 2000, little or no Swiss settlement funds had 
been distributed to Holocaust victims, despite the efforts of a superb district judge and dedicated 
settlement counsel. The notice period, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) fairness hearing process, 
and resultant appeals consumed eighteen months before distribution could begin. Once the Swiss 
settlement became final on May 30, 2001, with the dismissal of the final appeal from the fairness 
hearing, and the Plan of Allocation and Distribution was approved by the Second Circuit on July 26, 
2001, In re Holocaust Assets Litig., supra note 49, its pace of distribution dramatically increased. See 
supra Part I.E. 
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fierce bargaining in the shadow of the slave labor litigation94 and aided by the 
personal intervention of German Chancellor Schroeder and U.S. President 
Clinton, the parties reached agreement at a plenary negotiating session in 
Bonn, Germany, on a capitalization of DM 10 billion for the German 
Foundation. The money was to be paid in equal shares by the German 
government and by German industry.95  
By May 15, 2000, the parties had agreed on a complex formula, initially 
proposed by the United States, for allocating the DM 10 billion among 
categories of Holocaust victims. The German Foundation allocated DM 8.1 
billion for the payment of slave labor and forced labor claims to 
approximately one million eligible surviving victims.96 One billion 
deutschmarks has been set aside for payment of banking and insurance 
property claims to victims of German industry who have not been previously 
eligible for compensation. Seven hundred thousand deutschmarks has been 
set aside for a “Future Fund,” designed to foster tolerance in Europe.97 
Another DM 200,000 has been set aside for administrative expenses, 
including attorneys’ fees. 
The allocation discussions were particularly difficult since, although the 
DM 10 billion fund was substantial, it could not begin to provide full 
compensation to all deserving Holocaust victims with strong legal and moral 
claims. Accordingly, lawyer-participants in the negotiations, borrowing 
standards developed in the Second Circuit to govern the allocation of 
complex class action recoveries, were careful to assure that all payments by 
the German Foundation were linked to viable legal claims involving 
 94. The victims’ bargaining position was seriously eroded by the decisions of Judges Greenaway 
and Debevoise, issued on September 13, 1999, dismissing plaintiffs’ slave labor claims against major 
German companies. Burger-Fischer, supra note 2; Iwanowa, supra note 2. According to the District 
Courts, the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, supra note 69, had impliedly abrogated private international law 
claims for compensation arising out of German use of slave labor during World War II, and the 
German law claims were barred by an absurdly short two-year statute of limitations. Burger-Fischer, 
supra note 2; Iwanowa, supra note 2.  
 I believe that the decisions were almost certainly wrong in holding that the failure of the 2+4 
Treaty to have explicitly made provision for the slave labor claims caused their implied demise. Once 
the Two-Plus-Four Treaty lifted the bar to litigation imposed by the London Debt Agreement of 1953, 
no affirmative action was needed to preserve the preexisting international law claims for 
compensation. I believe the United States Department of Justice supports my view.  
 95. See Berlin Accords, supra note 4(g). 
 96. The amounts of slave labor payments are carefully allocated by country. Within each 
country, a “partner organization,” often government supported, has the responsibility for assembling 
the names of recipients and transferring funds to the recipient. No funds are transferred to the partner 
organizations until verified names of recipients are submitted to the German Foundation. Periodic 
audits are conducted to assure prompt distribution of the funds to victims. Thus far, funds have been 
distributed to 850,000 victims without serious incident.  
 97. See Berlin Accords, supra note 4(g). 
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Holocaust-related injuries.98  
In the context of the allocation discussions, the negotiating parties 
carefully considered the relationship between members of the Austrian bank 
settlement class and the German Foundation. The parties quickly agreed that, 
given German control of Austria during the Anschluss (Nazi Germany’s 
annexation of Austria), Austrian bank class members should be eligible to 
supplement payments from the $40 million Austrian bank cash settlement by 
seeking relief from the property claims panel established by the German 
Foundation on the same terms and conditions as any other claimant. The 
panel was established to distribute funds to Holocaust victims who had 
suffered uncompensated property damage at the hands of German industry. 
The German negotiators adamantly refused, however, to allocate funds from 
the German Foundation for the payment of claims premised solely on the 
Austrian assignment, arguing that the claims had been abrogated by the 
Austrian State Treaty of 1955. Additionally, concerns were raised over 
whether claims underlying the Austrian assignment, which appeared to be 
garden-variety intercorporate looting, should qualify as Holocaust-related 
injuries, and whether the Austrian assignment, if it had value at all, could be 
enforced elsewhere.  
Several counsel who had been instrumental in the negotiation of the 
Austrian bank settlement agreement vigorously, but unsuccessfully, 
attempted to persuade the negotiating parties to set aside German Foundation 
funds for the payment of Austrian assignment claims, warning that Judge 
Kram, who was presiding over the Austrian bank litigation, would seek to 
block the German Foundation unless funds were allocated to the Austrian 
assignment claims.  
Counsel who had played no role in the Austrian bank settlement argued 
that it would be wrong to shift scarce German Foundation funds from 
Holocaust victims with viable legal claims to Austrian assignment claimants 
who lacked a viable legal claim, especially when the claims underlying the 
Austrian assignment did not appear to be Holocaust-related and could, in any 
event, be enforced elsewhere. After hearing the various arguments, Deputy 
Secretary Stuart Eizenstat, who chaired the United States delegation, urged 
the parties to accept an allocation formula that remitted Austrian assignment 
claimants to independent enforcement of their claims. All counsel ultimately 
acceded to Secretary Eizenstat’s suggestion.  
In June 2000, the negotiating parties then turned to the final phase of the 
 
 98. See In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., supra note 49; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability 
Litig., supra note 41, at 183-84. See also Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Helfand, 687 F.2d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 
1982).  
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negotiations, the provision of so-called “legal peace” to German industry in 
return for the establishment of the German Foundation. The German 
negotiators insisted upon legal peace as a precondition to the establishment 
of the German Foundation.99 Attaining legal peace, the parties agreed, 
entailed two concepts: (1) deferring the actual payment of German Industry’s 
DM 5 billion financial commitment to the German Foundation until the 
dismissal of all Holocaust-related litigation pending in American courts100 
and (2) signing an Executive Agreement between Germany and the United 
States committing the United States to file a Statement of Interest in future 
Holocaust-related litigation against German defendants that urged the courts 
to consider the German Foundation as the exclusive forum for the resolution 
of Holocaust-related claims.101  
On July 17, 2000, the agreements establishing the German Foundation 
were formalized in three documents referred to as the Berlin Accords: (1) a 
Joint Statement of the Negotiating Parties, including a detailed allocation 
formula and a definition of “legal peace”; (2) an Executive Agreement 
between Germany and the United States committing the United States to file 
a Statement of Interest in connection with future Holocaust-related litigation 
against German defendants; and (3) a statute of the Bundestag (the 
Foundation Law), enacted on August 12, 2000, bringing the German 
 99. Counsel initially attempted to persuade German industry that a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 class action would provide the most enduring “legal peace.” Since the German 
negotiators had an aversion to class actions, the idea went nowhere. In the end, the German side was 
willing to trade less enduring “legal peace” for freedom from an American class action.  
 100. The claims of named plaintiffs were to be dismissed voluntarily with prejudice. Claims of 
putative class members were to be dismissed without prejudice. Almost all individual dismissals were 
voluntary. In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 213 F. Supp.2d 439, 442 (D.N.J. 
2002). The few involuntary individual dismissals were based on the Statement of Interest filed by the 
United States in accordance with the U.S-German Executive Agreement discussed infra note 104. 
Several Holocaust-era cases against German defendants remain pending. See Gerling Global 
Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, supra note 2; Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Gallagher, supra note 2. 
See also Deutsch v. Turner Corp., CV-4405 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (appeal pending); Ungaro-Benages v. 
Dresdner Bank AG, No. 1:01 CV 2547 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2001). 
 101. Power to enter into an Executive Agreement binding the Executive branch to ask the Article 
III courts to defer to the German Foundation in connection with future Holocaust-era litigation was 
premised on Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1980), upholding an Executive Agreement with 
Iran arising out of the hostage crisis that extinguished causes of action against Iran and remitted 
plaintiffs to an international claims program at The Hague. Unlike Dames & Moore, no effort was 
made to extinguish the underlying cause of action against German defendants. Instead, the Executive 
branch committed to filing a precatory suggestion that Article III courts treat the German Foundation 
as the exclusive forum for resolving Holocaust-related claims against German defendants. Such a 
precatory Statement of Interest has no preclusive effect. It leaves to the discretion of an Article III 
court whether additional Holocaust-era litigation should be entertained. See, e.g., Kadic, supra note 29; 
Am. Int’l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See generally Japan 
Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986). See also In re Nazi Era Cases Against 
German Defendants Litig. (Frumkin) 129 F. Supp.2d 370 (2001). 
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Foundation into existence as an instrumentality of the German government 
and codifying the parties’ agreements as German law.102 On August 21, 
2000, the United States appointed me to the Kuratorium (Board of Trustees) 
of the German Foundation to fill the seat reserved for a lawyer representing 
victims of the Holocaust.103 The position is uncompensated.  
3. Dismissing Class Actions in American Courts 
Beginning in September 2000 counsel began the process of securing 
dismissals of pending Holocaust-era litigation against German defendants104 
in order to fulfill the precondition to the payment of funds to the German 
Foundation by German industry.105 After a searching inquiry, Judge William 
G. Bassler of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey upheld the 
voluntary dismissal of virtually all pending slave labor cases against German 
defendants.106 Shortly thereafter, Chief Judge Michael Mukasey upheld the 
voluntary dismissal of all pending Holocaust-era insurance cases against 
German defendants, characterizing counsels’ work as “remarkable.”107 On 
December 28, 2000, Special Master Charles Stillman, who had been 
 102. Copies of the basic documents that make up the Berlin Accords have been deposited with the 
Law Quarterly. See supra note 4(g). 
 103. The Board of Trustees of the German Foundation consists of representatives of the eight 
founding nations, representatives of five nongovernmental organizations serving Holocaust victims, 
four representatives of German industry, representatives of all major political groups in the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat, representatives of the German Executive, and one private lawyer representing 
Holocaust victims. The Board is chaired by Ambassador Dieter Kastrup, Germany’s past-Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations and currently Chancellor Schroeder’s Foreign Affairs advisor. 
Otto Graf Lambsdorff serves as Chancellor Schroeder’s personal representative and as Vice Chair of 
the Board of Trustees. Pursuant to German law, the day-to-day management of the Foundation rests 
with a three-person Board of Directors elected by the trustees.   
 104. The Joint Statement requires the dismissal with prejudice of all pending individual actions 
and the dismissal without prejudice of claims of putative members of uncertified classes as a 
precondition to the payment of the German industry contribution of DM 5 billion, plus at least DM 
100 million in interest. Unfortunately, disagreement has arisen concerning the meaning of the interest 
clause. German industry views it as establishing a ceiling; plaintiffs insist that it sets a floor. The 
District Court recently refused to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion designed to enforce the settlement 
agreement, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. An independent action seeking to enforce the settlement 
agreement is pending. In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 213 F. Supp.2d 439 
(D.N.J. 2002).  
 105. The German government’s DM 5 billion payment to the German Foundation was made on 
schedule in two equal payments on October 31, 2000, and December 31, 2000. As discussed supra 
note 104, German industry’s payment of DM 5 billion, plus DM 100 million in interest, was begun in 
June 2001 and completed in October 2001. The parties disagree over whether an additional interest 
payment of approximately DM 100 million is payable. 
 106. In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., supra note 64. On March 1, 2001, 
Judge Bassler dismissed the remaining cases, giving weight to the Statement of Interest filed by the 
United States. Id. 
 107. See various orders of Judge Mukasey, supra note 4(m). See also supra note 16. 
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appointed by Judge Kram to investigate the fairness of the German 
Foundation, warmly recommended the dismissal of all pending Holocaust-
era cases against German banking defendants, thereby achieving legal peace 
and opening the way for immediate establishment of the German 
Foundation.108  
Unfortunately, Judge Kram, deeply concerned over the refusal of the 
German Foundation to set aside funds to pay claims under the Austrian 
assignment,109 declined to permit voluntary dismissal of the German bank 
cases unless the German Foundation altered its position with respect to the 
Austrian assignment.110 Judge Kram was concerned that class counsel in the 
Austrian bank case had agreed to the establishment of the German 
Foundation without insisting upon payments to Austrian bank claimants 
under the Austrian assignment. She suggested that Austrian class counsel had 
abandoned the interests of the Austrian bank claimants in favor of other 
Holocaust victims. After a fruitless series of efforts to persuade Judge Kram 
to permit the German Foundation to come into being without setting aside 
funds to pay worthless Austrian assignment claims, counsel filed a petition 
for a writ of mandamus with the Second Circuit on March 20, 2000, seeking 
an order compelling Judge Kram to permit dismissal of the German bank 
cases in order to allow the German Foundation to come into being.111  
Judge Kram vigorously resisted the applications, retaining David Boies to 
represent her personally in the Second Circuit, and appointing separate 
counsel to protect the rights of holders of the Austrian assignment. Heated 
language was exchanged in the mandamus papers, with Judge Kram’s 
lawyers alleging ethical lapses by plaintiffs’ counsel, and plaintiffs’ counsel 
alleging that Judge Kram, in an effort to salvage a failed class action 
settlement in the Austrian bank case, was engaging in a form of “hold up,” 
designed to force the German Foundation to recognize legally worthless 
claims under the Austrian assignment as the price of its existence.  
On May 17, 2000, the Second Circuit issued a writ of mandamus 
directing dismissal of the German bank cases, holding that principles of 
Separation of Powers deprived the District Court of power to seek to interfere 
with the activities of the German Foundation.112 On May 18, 2001, in 
response to the writ, Judge Kram entered an order unconditionally dismissing 
 108. See Report of Special Master Charles Stillman, supra note 4(l). 
 109. The Austrian assignment is described supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 110. Judge Kram codified her refusal to permit voluntary dismissal of the German bank cases in 
two opinions, dated March 7, 2000, and March 20, 2000. See In re Austrian & German Bank 
Holocaust Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2311 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2001). 
 111. In re Austrian & German Holocaust Litig. (Duveen), 250 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 112. In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., supra note 79. 
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the German bank cases. On May 21, 2001, Judge Kram abandoned the effort 
to appoint separate counsel to enforce the Austrian assignment, noting that 
the Austrian Ambassador to the United States had expressed doubt over the 
legal viability of the underlying claims and that the action of the German 
Foundation in opening its property compensation fund to Austrian bank 
claimants had conferred a significant benefit on the Austrian bank settlement 
class.113  
On May 30, 2001, the German Bundestag announced the achievement of 
legal peace, paving the way for the speedy transfer of German industry’s DM 
5 billion (plus at least DM 100 million in interest) commitment to the 
German Foundation.114 Distribution of the German Foundation’s assets to 
Holocaust victims began virtually immediately. Between June 2001 and 
August 2002, the German Foundation distributed more than DM 3.5 billion 
in connection with payments to 850,000 Holocaust victims. 
III. SOME PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS 
A. Should the Cases Have Been Brought? 
This brief overview of the Holocaust litigation makes it clear that a broad 
array of difficult substantive and procedural issues are raised by the cases, 
ranging from federal jurisdiction to complex issues of international law. 
Perhaps more importantly, the cases raise profound moral and strategic 
questions. Did the litigation unduly “monetize” the horrors of the Holocaust, 
reducing the appalling reality from a moral to a material event?115 Did the 
litigation force survivors to re-live horrible experiences that they had 
managed to surmount?116 Did it give the impression that survivors were 
 113. See Judge Kram’s Order and Transcript, supra note 4(k). 
 114. Between June and October 2001, German industry completed the transfer to the German 
Foundation of virtually its entire DM 5 billion financial obligation, plus a DM 100 million interest 
payment. See supra notes 104-05. Disagreement also exists over payments of approximately DM 63 
million to the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), for which 
certain German insurance companies claim a credit.  
 115. Debates over the wisdom of seeking restitution from Swiss, German, Austrian, and French 
companies for their Holocaust-related behavior mirrors the bitter disputes during the 1950s in Israel 
and the Diaspora over whether to accept reparations from Germany. Professor Bayzler identifies 
ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES, 
9, 23-27 (2000) and TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 189-252 
(1991), as helpful descriptions of the early debates. The early debates ended in favor of accepting 
reparations. Germany estimates that it has paid at least DM 100 billion in reparations for Nazi 
atrocities.  
 116. Criticism has been leveled at the questionnaires circulated as part of the Swiss banks 
settlement. Questionnaires seeking information from potential class members were sent to 
approximately one million Holocaust victims and their families. The questionnaires, which asked 
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interested in blackmail?117 Did it result in increased anti-Semitism?118 Did 
the lawyers profiteer?119 Were the settlements adequate?120 Were the 
allocations fair?121 Can the litigation be replicated in other areas, such as 
reparations for black slavery? 
I am too close to the process to respond fully to many of these questions, 
especially the moral and strategic ones. Apart from the emotional drive to 
assist Holocaust victims whose claims had been ignored for more than fifty 
recipients to describe the nature of their monetary losses, had a twofold purpose: (1) to allow potential 
class members to express support for or opposition to the settlement; and (2) to gather information 
needed to assist the Special Master in designing a fair plan of allocation. Approximately 580,000 
questionnaires were returned, demonstrating overwhelming support for the settlement. Only 300 
persons elected to opt out of the class. 
 Filling out the questionnaires was undoubtedly a painful process for many Holocaust survivors. 
On the other hand, the information gleaned from the questionnaires was important in structuring the 
allocation plan, and will, I believe, be a priceless trove of information for historians. The 
questionnaires will be placed in an appropriate historical archive at the close of the case. 
 117.  Some, notably Norman Finklestein, have claimed that the Holocaust-related litigation was a 
form of blackmail. The blackmail critique is puzzling and very unfair. The legal and factual claims 
against Swiss banks and German industry for profiteering at the expense of Holocaust victims were 
clearly well-founded. I do not understand why the vigorous assertion of a well-founded legal claim can 
be equated with blackmail. Surely, the test for legitimacy in litigation cannot be certainty of victory. 
Perhaps the blackmail critique is aimed at the use of political and public pressure to force the German 
and Swiss corporations to the bargaining table. If that is blackmail, though, most of what goes on in a 
democracy is blackmail. When I boycotted grapes to support farm workers seeking a union contract, 
was that blackmail? Is a strike by a labor union blackmail? Was the boycott of apartheid South Africa 
blackmail? If, as I believe strongly, the legal claims underlying the Holocaust-related litigation were 
well founded, nothing that occurred during the litigation aimed at forcing the defendants to take the 
claims seriously can remotely be equated with blackmail. 
 118. The recent Holocaust-related litigation does appear to have stimulated anti-Jewish feeling in 
Switzerland. On the other hand, the German Foundation appears to have the broad support of the 
German people. My response to the anti-Semitism argument is that refusal to suffer injustice without 
fighting back is the best way to fight anti-Semitism. It is, in my opinion, much more dangerous for 
Jews to remain silent in the face of injustice than to challenge it openly. 
 119. One of the infuriating aspects of press coverage of the Holocaust litigation has been the 
constant harping on greedy lawyers out to make a fast buck on the suffering of Holocaust victims. 
Most of the lawyers behaved responsibly. Thus far, the only grant of fees has been a total of 
approximately $50 million payable to fifty-one lawyers by the German Foundation at the 
recommendation of Nicholas deß Katzenbach and Kenneth Feinberg. In the interest of full disclosure, 
the arbitrators awarded me approximately $4.3 million for my efforts on behalf of the German 
Foundation. In connection with the Swiss bank case, Mel Weiss, Mike Hausfeld, and I have waived 
fees in connection with obtaining the settlement in the Swiss case, leading to a total fee structure in 
that case for achieing the settlement of approximately $6 million, of which $1.6 million is being 
donated to Columbia Law School. If that is profiteering, we could use more of it. 
 120. I have repeatedly conceded that the amounts involved are far too small to even begin to 
approach real compensation. But, given the limits of the real-world, I believe $8 billion is an 
acceptable figure.   
 121. Gabriel Schoenfeld has been critical of the Holocaust-related litigation, arguing that it 
overlooks the interests of individual survivors in favor of organizations and distorts the historical 
record. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Holocaust Reparations—A Growing Scandal, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1, 
2000, at 25. I can only reply that every effort has been made to provide funds to survivors, not to 
organizations, and that the cases have strengthened the historical record, not distorted it. 
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years, I felt the litigation was necessary to close a hole in international 
jurisprudence. In the years since the Nuremberg Tribunals, we have moved 
slowly, but inexorably, towards a conception of transnational law that holds 
actors responsible for violations of norms of human decency, regardless of 
local law.122 The United Nations war crimes tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the existence of a treaty ratified by almost sixty 
nations (but not the United States) establishing the International Criminal 
Court in Rome, bears witness to the maturation of the idea that international 
law is finally learning how to deal with the monster who establishes and 
operates death camps. Such a monster is guilty of crimes against humanity 
and should be tried before an international tribunal for violation of the 
Nuremberg Principles.  
But there has been no parallel discussion about how to deal with the 
person who manufactures and sells the poison gas or the barbed wire for use 
in the death camps, knowing that the profit-making activity aids and abets in 
the commission of a crime against humanity. As the appended June 16, 1997, 
memorandum of law in the Swiss case123 demonstrates, I went back to 
Aristotle and asked why general principles of unjust enrichment and 
restitution, derived from Nichomachean Ethics, do not compel recognition of 
a general principle of international law that causes the profits of genocide or 
crimes against humanity to be held in constructive trust for the victims. In 
short, I wanted to take the profit out of cooperating with war criminals. In 
fact, the theme that links the Swiss bank cases, the German slave labor cases, 
the German bank cases, and the German insurance cases is an attempt to 
identify the unjust enrichment derived by private defendants and to force 
restitution to the victims or their heirs of the unjust profit. Establishing that 
principle seemed to me of sufficient importance to warrant the risk of tainting 
the memory of the Holocaust with materialism. 
As I became more deeply enmeshed in the litigation, questions of 
allocation complicated my early, naive vision of the cases as premised on a 
simple desire to force the disgorgement of unjust profits. I badly 
underestimated the difficulty of the question of to whom the profits should be 
disgorged to, and I underestimated the quintessential lawyer’s challenge of 
how to work out a mechanism to develop a fair allocation plan. The various 
 122. For more discussion on the development of transnational law, see Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991). See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern 
Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, STEFAN S. RIESENFELD SYMPOSIUM 2001: 
World War II Compensation and Foreign Relations Federalism, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 282 (2002). 
 123. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law dated June 1997, supra note 4(b). 
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documents that I filed in support of the fairness of the Swiss settlement and 
the German Foundation forced me to confront the fairness of a series of 
possible allocations and the alternatives available to lawyers in attempting to 
evolve allocation mechanisms. I rejected the classic adversary model as a 
means of developing an allocation plan because I refused to pit Holocaust 
survivors against one another in an undignified scramble for a piece of a 
legally sufficient, but morally inadequate, settlement fund. Instead, I sought 
to develop an allocation procedure that respected democratic theory by using 
“exit, loyalty, and voice” in order to create ad hoc political entities in the 
form of Swiss settlement classes and the German Foundation capable of 
binding members of the survivor community to decisions reached by fair 
procedures.  
Moreover, as the factual record became richer and more compelling, I 
realized that another reason for bringing the cases was to speak to history—to 
build a historical record that could never be denied. I now believe that the 
remarkable outpouring of memory that took place in the 580,000 
questionnaires returned in the Swiss bank case may well be a priceless trove 
of history, constituting the last and only poll of the surviving Holocaust 
generation. The historical data uncovered by the Volcker Committee, the 
Bergier Committee, and the CRT II process have forever changed the way 
Switzerland can view its World War II experience. Finally, the factual 
material developed in connection with the German slave labor litigation, and 
the data assembled in connection with allocation, forced the recognition of 
the massive evil at the heart of the Nazi industrial complex. 
I remain convinced the litigation was both morally and strategically 
worthwhile, especially since it has brought economic relief to so many poor 
survivors in Eastern Europe. But I will leave that question for others—it is 
toward more mundane lawyers’ issues that I want to turn in closing: (1) Was 
it appropriate to litigate the cases in an American court? (2) Was the task of 
allocation adequately performed?  
B. Should the Cases Have Been Brought in an American Court? 
I want to avoid the temptation to advance a technical answer to this 
question. The appended briefs124 discuss the complex issues of general 
jurisdiction, venue, forum non conveniens, act of state doctrine, and equitable 
abstention that would underlie any effort to shift the Holocaust-related 
litigation to another country. We can do that dance if we wish to. But I 
 124. See id. See also Brief of Appellants to the Third Circuit, supra note 4(c). 
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believe that the technical answers are driven by something deeper—a sense 
of the moral obligation of foreign defendants to live by American rules of 
fundamental fairness, both substantive and procedural, if they wish to 
participate in the remarkable success of this economic, social, and political 
culture. The fact is that alternative forums are simply inadequate to give the 
victims a fighting chance at justice. 
At the risk of hubris, I want to remind us all of the astonishing success of 
our economic and political models. Measured by prosperity, freedom, 
innovation, tolerance, and the simultaneous achievement of social mobility 
and political stability, the American experiment is a remarkable success.125 It 
is so successful that no major economic player on the world stage can hope 
to succeed without participating vigorously in our market and reaping the 
benefits of our economic prosperity. 
But that market, and the resulting prosperity, did not spring up by 
accident. Our success flows from a social and political commitment to 
fairness and the values of decency that find their expression in the American 
respect for the rule of law—a virtually unique legal system that provides a 
genuinely level playing field for a poor Holocaust survivor seeking to 
confront a corporate giant. In short, I believe that we are prosperous in large 
part because we have enjoyed—and dispensed—the blessings of “Equal 
Justice under Law” and have built a legal system that provides the weak with 
a fair chance at victory, at least sometimes. When a foreign corporation 
wishes to reap the benefits of our economic and social system, I am not the 
slightest bit embarrassed to insist that the foreign corporation agree to live by 
the legal rules that allowed the social and economic system to flourish.  
Thus, there is a choice to be made: remain provincial and shield yourself 
from American values as expressed in the American legal system or seek to 
play on the American stage and learn to live by them. In short, I do not 
apologize to foreign defendants who want to reap the benefits of the 
American dream without agreeing to play by American rules. 
Having made my jingoistic point, I would rather have litigated the 
Holocaust cases in the countries where the evil took place. Effective 
litigation in those countries would have been more educational and would 
have contributed to the growth of a world in which reoccurrence of the 
Holocaust is unthinkable. That is why I believe that the 1996 Krakauer 
 125. I have spent too many years as Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union to 
pretend that the system is perfect or even close to perfect. We have our problems of race, gender, and 
intractable pockets of poverty. Moreover, there is much to deplore in our culture’s acceptance—indeed 
embrace—of sex and violence and the growth of a popular culture that coarsens our lives by 
celebrating material values to the exclusion of almost everything else.  
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decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court that lifted the bar of the 
London Debt Agreement of 1953 and made the slave labor litigation possible 
was so important. It was a German decision that helped make possible a 
German Foundation constituting a German response to the problem, a 
response that has widespread support among the German people. More than 
six thousand German companies have contributed to the German Foundation, 
many of which had no possible exposure to an American lawsuit, but simply 
wanted to help right a historic wrong. 
Unfortunately, Krakauers are in short supply. The legal systems of 
Switzerland and Germany are so stacked in favor of defendants and so 
hostile to the claims set forth in the Holocaust cases that it would have been 
suicidal to litigate in those forums. Swiss pleading law would have ended the 
Swiss bank litigation before it began. German procedure would have made it 
impossible to sue effectively on behalf of classes of slave laborers. 
“Discovery” is a dirty word in both Germany and Switzerland. Class actions 
are perceived as a symptom of American madness. The mindset of the 
judiciary is timid and rigidly locked into the status quo. In short, the 
European courtroom is not currently a level playing field; it is a fortress for 
the powerful. Until European justice evolves into a level playing field, 
lawyers have no choice but to resort to an American courtroom as the only 
game in town.  
C. Were the Procedures Surrounding Allocation Adequate? 
Amchem126 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.127 warn that mass resolution of 
disputes must be sensitive to fairness in the allocation process. The allocation 
issues posed by the Holocaust litigation were extraordinarily difficult. The 
Swiss settlement has five classes, as noted above. Moreover, except for the 
Slave Labor II class, the Swiss settlement only benefits Jews, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, Sinti-Roma, homosexuals, and the disabled. National origin and 
political persecutees are excluded and are free to bring their own lawsuit.  
The Second Circuit upheld the exclusion of national origin and political 
persecutees from the class definition.128 Moreover, the Circuit also upheld the 
allocation of $800 million to bank accounts; approximately $200 million to 
Slave Labor I and Slave Labor II; $100 million to Looted Assets, 
administered cy pres for the poorest survivors; and up to $80 million for 
 126. See supra note 40.  
 127. 527 U.S. 815 (1997). See also Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 
2001), cert. granted, Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenseon, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 8078 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2002). 
 128. See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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Refugees, as well as approximately $50 million to $75 million for 
administrative expenses, including an enormously ambitious worldwide 
notice program and an expensive claims facility in Zurich under the auspices 
of Paul Volcker to determine claims to bank accounts.129 As my appended 
declarations in support of the allocation process130 recites, I believe that the 
use of a Special Master, with careful, unbiased consideration of the claims of 
each class, satisfies the fairness concerns presented by Amchem and Ortiz. It 
would, I believe, have been terrible social policy, and very bad law, to have 
pitted the elderly survivors against each other in a classically adversary 
struggle for the settlement proceeds. I vowed that we would avoid a situation 
where the last thing a survivor would remember was fighting with another 
survivor for a pittance. But avoiding a classic adversary proceeding entails 
risk. I believe that one of the challenges of Amchem and Ortiz is to explore 
allocation procedures that do not replicate war but assure fairness to the class 
members. The technique that we used in the Swiss bank case of a neutral 
Special Master, open access to the Special Master, and commitment by each 
lawyer to assist all persons seeking access to the Special Master was the right 
one for the social context of this case. 
The allocation mechanism in the German Foundation avoided the judicial 
process entirely.131 Instead, it took place in the context of international 
negotiations involving a hybrid of diplomacy, settlement talks, and 
humanitarianism. A double allocation was required. First, it was necessary to 
allocate the DM 10 billion among the categories of claimants. Eventually, 
DN 8.1 billion went to slave labor, DM 1 billion to property loss, DM 700 
million to a Future Fund to support tolerance in Europe, and DM 200 million 
for administration, including legal fees.132 Then, it became necessary to 
allocate the slave labor funds by country and the banking and insurance 
funds between persons with “hard” claims and persons whose documents 
were destroyed or who died heirless. Should we seek to replicate the German 
Foundation allocation process by taking the allocation process out of the 
judiciary in complex class actions? Is it possible to develop allocation 
 129. Subsequent to the Second Circuit’s order, the district court increased funds allocated to the 
Slave Labor and Looted Assets classes by 45%. Id. at 812. 
 130. See supra note 4(e). 
 131. The process is described in my appended declaration seeking leave to dismiss the German 
slave labor cases in order to permit the German Foundation to come into being. See Nov. 13, 2000, 
document in support of the German Foundation’s allocation plan, supra note 4(e). 
 132. Legal fees were negotiated as part of the international agreement establishing the Foundation. 
The parties agreed that a maximum of DM 125 million, and a minimum of DM 100 million would be 
allocated by arbitrators, Nicholas deß Katzenbach and Kenneth Feinberg, on the basis of time charges 
and the relative value of the services. 
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mechanisms in which government plays a role at the negotiating table, 
thereby enabling the parties to reach an agreement on allocation pursuant to a 
fair process without engaging in classic adversary proceedings that would 
render the process unmanageable? 
CONCLUSION 
This preliminary paper merely scratches the surface of the legal and 
political issues raised by the Holocaust cases. For example, what is the effect 
of the Statement of Interest filed by the United States pursuant to the 
Executive Agreement between Germany and the United States that brought 
the German Foundation into being?133 Will the notion of a nationwide release 
of all Swiss defendants survive collateral attack? Most importantly, is the 
Holocaust litigation a model for other efforts to enforce international norms 
in an American court? Does the theory of unjust enrichment and restitution at 
the heart of the Holocaust cases transfer to other great historical injustices 
such as corporate unjust enrichment from slavery?  
Efforts to replicate the success of the Holocaust litigation in the context of 
victims of Japanese crimes against humanity are currently underway. Can 
Korean “comfort women” forced into prostitution by the Japanese 
government find justice in an American courtroom after fifty years?134 
Armenian plaintiffs are exploring actions against insurance companies 
arising out of the great historical injustices perpetrated against the Armenian 
people. Debates over reparations for black slavery dominated the recent 
United Nations gathering in Durban, South Africa.  
Finally, given the success of the Holocaust litigation in playing a 
significant role in generating $8 billion in compensation for Holocaust 
victims, what role does law—and American justice—have in dealing with 
such issues in the context of victims who cannot marshal the political and 
social clout displayed by victims of the Holocaust?  
 133. The issue is currently pending in Deutsch v. Turner Corp. and in Ungaro-Benages v. 
Dresdner Bank AG, supra note 101. See also In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig. 
(Frumkin), 129 F. Supp.2d 370 (2001). 
 134. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp.2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001) (appeal pending). 
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